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THE FORUM NON CONVENIENS DISMISSAL IN




This Note addresses whether a federal court may dismiss an action on the
ground of forum non conveniens without resolving a difficult challenge to
its subject-matter jurisdiction. This scenario requires the resolution of two
important questions. First, to what extent may a federal court bypass a
question of subject-matter jurisdiction in order to dismiss a case on other
grounds? Second, is subject-matter jurisdiction a prerequisite for the
court's power to dismiss under the doctrine of forum non conveniens?
These questions implicate the sometimes competing concerns of
maintaining the structural integrity of the federal courts as courts of limited
jurisdiction and maximizing judicial flexibility to most effectively dismiss a
case on discretionary or procedural grounds. 1
The first question speaks to the extent to which federal courts are bound
by an order of operations in evaluating the jurisdictional and procedural
attributes of an action. In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,2
the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the long-standing principle that a
federal court must confirm the existence of its jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a dispute before resolving the merits. 3 Just one Term later,
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor
Thomas H. Lee for his invaluable guidance and Eileen for her unyielding patience and
support.
1. Generally, considerations of judicial efficiency and economy may not outweigh the
requirement that a federal court must operate within the contours of its subject-matter
jurisdiction. See, e.g., V.I. Hous. Auth. v. Coastal Gen. Constr. Servs. Corp., 27 F.3d 911,
916 (3d Cir. 1994) ("The allocation of judicial business to the courts is a matter of
constitutional and legislative mandates that must be honored by the courts regardless of
considerations of efficiency."). It is not clear, however, to what extent this mandate operates
to foreclose a federal court's consideration of jurisdictional and procedural grounds while
holding subject-matter jurisdiction analysis in abeyance. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil
Co., 526 U.S. 574, 586 (1999) (authorizing the dismissal of a case for want of personal
jurisdiction when "the district court... find[s] that concerns of judicial economy and
restraint are overriding").
2. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
3. See id at 101-02 ("For a court to pronounce upon the [merits] when it has nojurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra vires."). In Steel Co., the
U.S. Supreme Court repudiated the doctrine of "hypothetical jurisdiction," holding that a
federal court may not set aside a subject-matter jurisdiction determination in favor of an
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however, in Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,4 the Supreme Court
emphasized that this principle does not apply to issues that do not go to the
merits of a suit. 5 In Ruhrgas, the Supreme Court held that, in certain
situations, a federal court may dismiss a case for want of personal
jurisdiction before, and ultimately without, deciding whether it has subject-
matter jurisdiction over the dispute.6 This Note posits that the Ruhrgas
holding may be read broadly to countenance the pragmatic application of an
array of non-merits issues7 in order to dismiss a dispute without full
resolution of a jurisdictional question. 8 Moreover, Ruhrgas suggests a
method of analysis by which a court may determine whether such a
dismissal is proper. 9 This Note will examine the extent to which federal
courts have disagreed as to whether forum non conveniens falls within this
range of non-merits issues. 10
easier resolution on the merits, even if the prevailing party on the merits would be the
prevailing party if jurisdiction were denied. See id. at 93. Justice Antonin Scalia "decline[d]
to endorse such an approach because it carries the courts beyond the bounds of authorized
judicial action and thus offends fundamental principles of separation of powers." Id. at 94.
For a more complete analysis of the Court's denunciation of hypothetical jurisdiction in Steel
Co., see Scott C. Idleman, The Demise of Hypothetical Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 52
Vand. L. Rev. 235 (1999); see also infra Part 1.B. 1.
4. 526 U.S. 574.
5. See id. at 584-85 ("'[A] court that dismisses on... non-merits grounds such as...
personal jurisdiction, before finding subject-matter jurisdiction, makes no assumption of
law-declaring power that violates the separation of powers principles underlying ... Steel
Company."' (quoting In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (first two
omissions in original))).
6. Id. at 588. In so ruling, the Supreme Court overruled the holding of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that Steel Co. mandated initial verification of subject-matter
jurisdiction before ordering a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. See id. at 583.
7. This Note uses the distinction between "merits" and "non-merits" issues for
analytical purposes that do not necessarily coincide with doctrinal constructs. According to
Ruhrgas, the essential distinguishing feature of non-merits issues is that their invocation
denies the resolution of the claim underlying a suit. See id. at 585 ("It is hardly novel for a
federal court to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the
merits.").
8. See infra Part I.B. A number of recent Supreme Court and lower federal court
opinions suggest that Ruhrgas should be read to apply to issues other than personal
jurisdiction. See infra Part I.C.
9. See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 588 ("Where... a district court has before it a
straightforward personal jurisdiction issue presenting no complex question of state law, and
the alleged defect in subject-matter jurisdiction raises a difficult and novel question, the
court does not abuse its discretion by turning directly to personal jurisdiction."). Because
Ruhrgas provides a framework by which a federal court may determine the propriety of a
dismissal of a suit on non-merits grounds in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, this
Note uses the shorthand "Ruhrgas dismissal" for this class of dismissals. One commentator
has suggested the term "resequencing" to describe the action taken by a federal court in
choosing to sidestep subject-matter jurisdiction in favor of a dismissal on alternative
grounds. See Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the
Federal Courts, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 3 (2001). The doctrine of "jurisdictional
resequencing" takes its name from a passage in Ruhrgas, where the Court noted that Steel
Co.'s jurisdiction-before-merits mandate did not dictate a "'sequencing of jurisdictional
issues."' See id. at 3 n.5 (quoting Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584).
10. Compare Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp. v. Sinochem Int'l Co., 436 F.3d 349, 360-61
(3d Cir. 2006) (classifying forum non conveniens as a non-merits procedural issue),
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The second question focuses more fundamentally on the elements of
forum non conveniens itself. The federal common law doctrine of forum
non conveniens gives federal courts discretionary authority to decline the
exercise of otherwise sound jurisdiction where, on balance, the case is more
appropriately tried in another forum. 11 It is a matter of debate among
federal courts, however, as to whether the common law analysis that guides
the consideration of a motion to dismiss under forum non conveniens
requires antecedent resolution of subject-matter jurisdiction. 12 Thus, while,
pending resolution of the first question, forum non conveniens may be
among those issues that preclude a court's resolution of the merits, subject-
matter jurisdiction may be an essential component of the court's power to
dismiss on such grounds.
This Note posits that forum non conveniens is a non-merits inquiry on
which a court may dismiss without formal confirmation of subject-matter
jurisdiction. This interpretation recognizes both the flexibility inherent in
the forum non conveniens test 13 and the federal courts' competence to
sensitively balance the need for strict adherence to jurisdictional
requirements with considerations of judicial efficiency and economy. 14 It
does not follow, however, that the federal courts should wield undue
discretion in deciding difficult questions of this sort. Haphazard choices
based upon attractive considerations of convenience may undermine the
structural bounds that constrain the reach of the federal courts. Rather, this
Note proposes a method of analysis, built upon the Supreme Court's
holding in Ruhrgas, that will limit the ability of the courts to bypass a
question of subject-matter jurisdiction in favor of a dismissal under forum
non conveniens.
Part I discusses the criteria by which federal courts may determine
whether dismissal is proper without full resolution of a difficult subject-
matter jurisdiction question. Part II introduces the doctrine of forum non
Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. (Monde Re) v. Nak Naftogaz, 311 F.3d 488, 498 (2d
Cir. 2002) (determining that a dismissal for forum non conveniens without resolution of a
subject-matter jurisdiction challenge does not constitute an exercise of impermissible
hypothetical jurisdiction), and Papandreou, 139 F.3d at 255 (same), with Dominguez-Cota
v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 396 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2005) (classifying forum non
conveniens as a merits-related issue that may not forestall resolution of a subject-matter
jurisdiction question).
11. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 250 (1981); Koster v. (Am.)
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 530 (1947); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501, 507 (1947).
12. Compare Monde Re, 311 F.3d at 498 (suggesting that a federal court may dismiss
under forum non conveniens without antecedent resolution of statutory subject-matter
jurisdiction), and Papandreou, 139 F.3d at 255-56 (same), with Sinochem, 436 F.3d at 363-
64 (requiring confirmation of subject-matter jurisdiction before dismissal under forum non
conveniens).
13. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 249-50 (noting that the Supreme Court has "repeatedly
emphasized the need to retain flexibility" in the application of forum non conveniens).
14. See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 586-87 (permitting the dismissal for want of personal
jurisdiction in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, in part, on the ability of the federal
courts to make "sensitive judgments of this sort").
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conveniens and addresses the circuit split on whether subject-matter
jurisdiction is a necessary antecedent to a court's dismissal of an action
under forum non conveniens. Finally, Part III argues that such a dismissal
is appropriate under certain circumstances and suggests a formula for
determining whether those circumstances exist in a given case.
I. ISSUE HIERARCHY AND JUDICIAL PRAGMATISM
This part examines the extent to which federal courts are foreclosed from
dismissing or resolving a case on grounds other than jurisdictional defect
when questions pertaining to the courts' subject-matter jurisdiction are
unresolved. Part L.A discusses the critical structural limitations embodied
in the subject-matter jurisdiction inquiry. Part I.B focuses on two recent
Supreme Court opinions that attempt to define the extent to which the
federal courts may justify the pragmatic resolution of cases on non-Article
III grounds when their jurisdiction over the dispute is in doubt. Part I.C
introduces a number of federal court opinions that construe the Supreme
Court's holding in Ruhrgas to enhance judicial flexibility to address non-
merits issues in order to bypass resolution of subject-matter jurisdiction
questions.
A. Structural Limits: The Role of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Two structural limitations on federal judicial power were essential to the
framers' design of the federal judiciary. The first embodies the idea that
state courts should possess exclusive original jurisdiction over cases
implicating both federal and state law except where Congress has granted
the federal courts original jurisdiction within the limits set forth in Article
111.15 Generally understood as "federalism," this principle of vertical
restraint serves to protect independent state adjudicatory interests from
encroachment by the federal judiciary. 16 The second limitation represents
15. The lower federal courts are considered courts of limited jurisdiction. See Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2616 (2005) ("The district courts of the
United States, as we have said many times, are 'courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess
only that power authorized by Constitution and statute."' (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994))); see also 13 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur
R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3522 (2d ed. 1984). They
are empowered to hear only those cases that fall within the judicial power of the federal
government as outlined in the Constitution, and that Congress has entrusted to the federal
courts by operation of statute. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S.
443, 452 (2004) ("Only Congress may determine a lower federal court's subject-matter
jurisdiction.").
16. See Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 18 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("' [D]ue regard for the rightful independence of state governments, which should actuate
federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise
limits which the [congressional] statute has defined."' (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263,
270 (1934))). Most state courts are courts of general, not limited, subject-matter jurisdiction
and are not bound by the choices made by the framers and Congress that limit the
jurisdictional reach of the federal courts. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 366 (2001)
(describing state courts of general jurisdiction); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)
3150 [Vol. 74
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the idea that the work of the federal government should be apportioned
among three branches so as to prevent the agglomeration of power by one
branch. Thus, this horizontal "separation of powers" design conscripts each
of the three branches as a check against the other two. Of particular
relevance to this Note is the framers' allocation to the legislative branch
through Article III of the power to define the bounds of federal adjudicatory
jurisdiction within Article III limits.17 Subject-matter jurisdiction has been
described as the essential ingredient for the resolution of disputes in the
Article III courts because it polices both the vertical and horizontal
boundaries of the federal judicial power to adjudicate and resolve
disputes. 18
Federal courts must scrupulously monitor their jurisdiction over the
subject matter of any dispute because an absence of such jurisdiction
signifies that resolution of that matter falls outside the permissible bounds
of federal adjudicatory action. As a result, subject-matter jurisdiction has
unique procedural attributes. For instance, it may not be waived simply by
consent of the parties. 19 A federal court must take notice, on its own
motion if necessary, if its jurisdiction over a particular matter appears
(noting "the well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial courts of
general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out by Congress"); see also
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 728 (1996) (discussing the state court
adjudicatory interest in resolving local problems locally).
17. Congress need not extend the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts to the full
extent possible under Article Ill. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440, 448-49 (1850).
For example, while Article III stipulates no minimum amount in controversy to establish
jurisdiction over a controversy "between Citizens of different States," U.S. Const. art. III, §
2, cl. 1, Congress has limited federal jurisdiction to those diversity controversies "where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000." 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). The
exception to the requirement of congressional vesting is the original jurisdiction of the U.S.
Supreme Court which is self-executing. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; California v.
Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 65 (1979) ("The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is
conferred not by the Congress but by the Constitution itself. This jurisdiction is self-
executing, and needs no legislative implementation."). See generally Thomas H. Lee, The
Supreme Court of the United States as Quasi-International Tribunal: Reclaiming the
Court's Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction over Treaty-Based Suits by Foreign States
Against States, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1765 (2004).
18. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869); see also McDonald v.
Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) ("The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power .. ");
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 718 (1838) ("Jurisdiction is the power
to hear and determine the subject-matter in controversy between parties to a suit, to
adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over them ...."); Lawrence Gene Sager,
Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 17, 22 (1980) ("[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction in our
legal system refers to the motive force of a court, the root power to adjudicate a specified set
of controversies. Ultimately, jurisdiction is an essential part of what makes a court a
court ... ").
19. See, e.g., Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428 (1998) (noting that parties may
not waive jurisdictional questions of either constitutional or statutory construction); People's
Bank v. Calhoun, 102 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1880) ("[T]he mere consent of parties cannot confer
upon a court of the United States the jurisdiction to hear and decide a case."); Capron v. Van
Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 125, 126 (1804) ("[I]t was the duty of the court to see that they
had jurisdiction, for the consent of parties could not give it.").
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wanting, regardless of whether the court is exercising original jurisdiction
over a claim or reviewing a lower court decision on appeal. 20 Moreover,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure underscore the primacy of the subject-
matter jurisdiction inquiry. While the right to object on the various grounds
of procedural defect is waived if such an objection is not raised within a
time stipulated in the rules, Rule 12(h)(3) provides that "[w]henever it
appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. '21
B. The Steel Co./Ruhrgas Two-Step
Two recent Supreme Court decisions demonstrate the delicate balance
between adherence to structural limits on the reach of federal adjudicatory
authority and the desire for judicial pragmatism and flexibility. In Steel Co.
v. Citizens for a Better Environment,22 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
sequential priority of the subject-matter jurisdiction inquiry and foreclosed
the resolution of the underlying dispute on the merits without full resolution
of a potential jurisdictional infirmity, despite the potentially damaging blow
such a rigid stance may deal to considerations of judicial economy.23 The
holding was a stem warning to the lower federal courts that, in the
majority's view, had strayed too far from core structural principles. 24 Just
one Term later in Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,25 the Supreme Court
provided a powerful pragmatic counterpoint by granting the lower federal
courts some modicum of discretion to dismiss an action on non-merits,
threshold grounds, specifically, personal jurisdiction. 26 This section will
consider these decisions and explore the justifications for treating merits
decisions differently from non-merits-based dismissals.
1. Steel Co.
In Steel Co., the Supreme Court repudiated the doctrine of hypothetical
jurisdiction, a pragmatic doctrine devised by the lower federal courts for the
swift resolution of cases without messy and time-consuming jurisdictional
analysis. 27 A court invoking the doctrine assumed the existence of subject-
20. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1237 (2006) ("[C]ourts, including
[the Supreme] Court, have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter
jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party."); Mt. Healthy City
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977) ("[W]e are obliged to inquire sua
sponte whenever a doubt arises as to the existence of federal jurisdiction.").
21. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
22. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
23. See id at 93-102.
24. See Idleman, supra note 9, at 2-4 (describing the Supreme Court's recent efforts to
reinforce structural limitations on the reach of the federal government and its branches and
the role Steel Co. played in furthering this agenda).
25. 526 U.S. 574 (1999).
26. See id at 583-88.
27. See RNR Enters. v. SEC, 122 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing "judicial efficiency
and restraint" to justify hypothetical jurisdiction); see also United States v. Stoller, 78 F.3d
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matter jurisdiction in order to decide the action on less complicated merits
grounds. 28  In Steel Co., the Supreme Court identified two general
prerequisites for the application of hypothetical jurisdiction from relevant
circuit court decisions: "(1) the merits question is more readily resolved,
and (2) the prevailing party on the merits would be the same as the
prevailing party were jurisdiction denied. ' 29 For Justice Antonin Scalia,
writing for the majority, this pragmatic approach to the resolution of the
merits exceeded the limited authority of the federal judiciary. 30
The Supreme Court determined that the exercise of hypothetical
jurisdiction violated the framers' intent to limit federal judicial power.31 It
cast subject-matter jurisdiction as "an essential ingredient of separation and
equilibration of powers, restraining the courts from acting at certain times,
and even restraining them from acting permanently regarding certain
subjects."'32 When the federal courts operate outside the bounds of their
allocated power, they assume a share of the authority that is vested
elsewhere, thereby infringing upon the powers of the Congress to vest
federal adjudicatory authority and the plenary powers reserved to the
states. 33 Therefore, by assuming jurisdiction in order to definitively settle
the merits of a suit, a court also assumes the risk that it will issue a decision
710, 715 (1st Cir. 1996); Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1196 (7th Cir. 1996). For reflection on
the policy justifications underlying hypothetical jurisdiction, see Idleman, supra note 3, at
247-52; Comment, Assuming Jurisdiction Arguendo: The Rationale and Limits of
Hypothetical Jurisdiction, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 712 (1979). No matter the benefits accrued to
both the litigants and the courts, Judge Richard A. Posner considered hypothetical
jurisdiction "illogical" because
[j]urisdiction is the power to decide the merits of a claim; so a decision on the
merits presupposes jurisdiction. The pragmatic justification for occasionally
putting the merits cart before the jurisdictional horse begins by asking why federal
courts have a limited jurisdiction and have made rather a fetish of keeping within
its bounds. The answer is that these are extraordinarily powerful courts, and the
concept of limited jurisdiction enables them both to limit the occasions for the
exercise of power and to demonstrate self-restraint.
Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory 243 (1999).
28. See, e.g., SEC v. Am. Capital Invs., 98 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 1996) ("We have
applied 'hypothetical jurisdiction' where jurisdiction is disputed to assume, without
deciding, the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in order to reach the merits of an
appeal.").
29. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998).
30. Judge Posner describes Justice Scalia's opinion as "notably unpragmatic." See
Posner, supra note 27, at 243.
31. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94 ("[Hypothetical jurisdiction] carries the courts beyond
the bounds of authorized judicial action and thus offends fundamental principles of
separation of powers."); see also Ugo Colella & Adam Bain, The Burden of Proving
Jurisdiction Under the Federal Tort Claims Act: A Uniform Approach to Allocation, 67
Fordham L. Rev. 2859, 2876 (1999) (discussing why hypothetical jurisdiction infringes upon
the principle of limited jurisdiction); supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
32. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101.
33. See Anderson v. H&R Block, Inc., 287 F.3d 1038, 1041 (1 1th Cir. 2002) ("When a
federal court acts outside its jurisdiction, it violates principles of separation of powers and
federalism, interfering with Congress's authority to demarcate the jurisdiction of lower
federal courts, and with the states' authority to resolve disputes in their own courts.").
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that it has no power to make and enforce. 34 Justice Scalia chose to
reinforce the formal jurisdiction-before-merits requirement in order to avoid
the consequences of such a risk.35
Steel Co. may be more notable for what it excepts than what it repudiates.
In order to preserve the precedential value of prior cases where the Court
appeared to have countenanced some form of hypothetical jurisdiction,
Justice Scalia carved out a number of "exceptions" to the general
repudiation of hypothetical jurisdiction.36 Two of the cases that compelled
Justice Scalia to point to the conclusion that non-merits jurisdictional
questions may precede subject-matter jurisdiction questions on the
decisional line.37 First, Justice Scalia distinguished the declination of a
federal court's pendant jurisdiction 38 from a dismissal on the merits. 39 As
34. In a sense, the argument is tautological: "[F]or a court to act beyond its power is for
a court to act beyond its power." Posner, supra note 27, at 244.
35. See supra note 31. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, who concurred with the majority's
determination that the Steel Co. plaintiffs lacked sufficient Article III standing to invoke the
authority of the court, found such an outcome unnecessarily rigid because, in certain
situations, the rule of hypothetical jurisdiction "makes enormous practical sense." Steel Co.,
523 U.S. at 111 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). He argued
that it hurt both the court and the parties "to have appellate judges spend their time and
energy puzzling over the correct answer to an intractable jurisdictional matter, when
(assuming an easy answer on the substantive merits) the same party would win or lose
regardless." Id. In addition, according to Justice Breyer, the majority's formal holding
generated "a rigid 'order of operations' that would tax already overburdened federal courts.
Id. Thus, for Justice Breyer, the risk-reward assessment was not so impermissibly skewed so
as to make mandatory the "more cumbersome system" required by Justice Scalia. Id. at 112.
36. See Idleman, supra note 3, at 288-304 (analyzing the Steel Co. exceptions); Joshua
Schwartz, Note, Limiting Steel Co.: Recapturing a Broader "Arising Under" Jurisdictional
Question, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2255, 2268-72 (2004) (arguing that, on the whole, the Steel
Co. exceptions are incompatible with the Supreme Court's classification of cause of action
questions as merits-related and, therefore, unreachable without subject-matter jurisdiction).
37. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 100 n.3.
38. Pendant jurisdiction now exists by operation of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and, together with
the doctrine formerly known as antecedent jurisdiction, is a component of supplemental
jurisdiction. See Munson v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 969 F.2d 266, 268 n.1 (7th Cir.
1992) ("When a federal district court exercises jurisdiction over state law claims which are
so related to a claim over which the court has original jurisdiction that the federal and state
claims form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution, the court is now said to be exercising 'supplemental' jurisdiction over the state
claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367."). The classic formulation of pendant jurisdiction
comes from United Mine Workers v. Gibbs:
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there is a
claim "arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority... and the relationship
between that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action
before the court comprises but one constitutional "case." The federal claim must
have substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court. The
state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. But
if, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims
are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial
proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in
federal courts to hear the whole.
383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
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the Court has explained, a district court should decline an exercise of
pendant jurisdiction, in part, because of the federalist notion that "needless
decisions of state law should be avoided ... as a matter of comity. ' '40 The
case distinguished by Justice Scalia did not violate the precepts of Steel Co.
because "the case decided, not a merits question before a jurisdictional
question, but a discretionary jurisdictional question before a
nondiscretionary jurisdictional question."'41
In the previous "exception," the discretionary power of the district court
to decline an exercise of pendant jurisdiction was vested by operation of a
statutory grant and, thus, it may be argued that the declination was simply a
congressionally authorized exercise of statutory subject-matter
jurisdiction.42 Justice Scalia, however, went further when he approved the
preemptive discretionary declination of jurisdiction on grounds of Younger
abstention,43 a doctrine that the Supreme Court has elaborated apart from
any statute.44 In the distinguished case, the Court invoked Younger and
dismissed upon such grounds "in lieu of determining whether there was a
case or controversy," thereby setting aside the Article III jurisdictional
question.45  Like pendent jurisdiction, this doctrine of discretion is
predicated, in part, on federalist notions of comity and the respect for the
appropriate balance between state and federal interests. 46
These exceptions suggest that, in order to protect the dignity of state
courts, a court may apply wholly discretionary and prudential doctrines of
jurisdiction to refuse audience to the merits of an action even in the absence
of subject-matter jurisdiction.47 In fact, Justice Scalia admitted that these
cases "must be acknowledged to have diluted the absolute purity of the rule
that Article III jurisdiction is always an antecedent question." 48 Steel Co.,
39. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 100 n.3 (distinguishing Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S.
693 (1973)).
40. Moor, 411 U.S. at 712 (citation and internal quotation omitted).
41. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 100 n.3. In Gibbs, the Supreme Court announced that pendant
jurisdiction "is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiffs right." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. The
modem supplemental jurisdiction statute preserves this measure of discretion. 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c) (2000) ("The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
claim .... ). The statute also lists factors relevant to the court's determination. Id.
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
43. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 100 n.3 (distinguishing Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 436
(1975)). In Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court held that federal relief was barred in cases
where a state criminal prosecution is pending because of "the fundamental policy against
federal interference with state criminal prosecutions" and "the absence of the factors
necessary under equitable principles to justify federal intervention." 401 U.S. 37, 46, 54
(1971).
44. See Larry W. Yackle, Federal Courts 460 (2d ed. 2003).
45. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 100 n.3.
46. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 733-34 (1996).
47. See Idleman, supra note 3, at 302-04 ("This doctrine is not obviously inconsistent
with Steel Co., which holds only that a court cannot reach the merits of the suit prior to
verifying jurisdiction and does not necessarily speak to the niceties of verification itself.").
The Second Circuit has addressed a Younger question before subject-matter jurisdiction. See
Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 2003).
48. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101.
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therefore, appears to preserve district court flexibility to consider threshold
jurisdictional questions, even those vested in the discretion of the federal
court. 4 9 Moreover, in cases where the open question of subject-matter
jurisdiction is based on the Constitution, this flexible policy is congruent
with the notion of judicial restraint, which encourages the determination of
nonconstitutional questions before constitutional questions. 50
It is not clear, moreover, just how far Steel Co. goes in its repudiation of
hypothetical jurisdiction. For instance, two of the five Justices in the
majority wrote separately to express their view that federal courts, under
certain circumstances, might still possess some discretion to "'reserv[e]
difficult questions of ... jurisdiction when the case alternatively could be
resolved on the merits in favor of the same party. ' '' 51 On this basis, some
courts have interpreted Steel Co. as a plurality opinion that lacks the votes
to completely eliminate court flexibility to assume, rather than settle,
jurisdiction before deciding a merits question. 52 In addition, a number of
courts read Steel Co. to foreclose only those exercises in hypothetical
jurisdiction where the postulated lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
implicates constitutional limits, such as Article III standing. 53 On this
reading, a federal court may bypass statute-based subject-matter jurisdiction
49. See Idleman, supra note 3, at 302-04 (discussing the alternative jurisdictional
grounds doctrine).
50. See id. at 303-04. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance is invoked as a measure
of judicial restraint from intrusion into the legislative or administrative domain. See Three
Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157
(1984) ("It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint... that this Court will not reach
constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them."). Federal courts will
construe statutes so as to avoid serious constitutional defects "unless such construction is
plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
51. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 110-11 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Norton v.
Matthews, 427 U.S. 524, 532 (1976)). Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was joined in this
concurrence by Justice Anthony Kennedy. See id. at 110.
52. See, e.g., Penobscot Nation v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 254 F.3d 317, 324 (1st Cir. 2001); cf
United States ex rel. Foulds v. Tex. Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 287 n. 11 (5th Cir. 1999)
(noting the confusion as to the support for the repudiation of hypothetical jurisdiction).
53. At several points, Steel Co. appears to distinguish between Article III jurisdiction
and statutory subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 95 (refuting Justice
John Paul Stevens's assertion "that a court may decide the cause of action before resolving
Article III jurisdiction"); id. at 97 n.2 ("The reasons for allowing merits questions to be
decided before statutory standing questions do not support allowing merits questions to be
decided before Article III questions."); id. at 98 (considering "the practice of deciding the
cause of action before resolving Article III jurisdiction" as hypothetical jurisdiction); id. at
101 (acknowledging that some precedent appears to "dilute[] the absolute purity of the rule
that Article III jurisdiction is always an antecedent question"). For a more detailed analysis
of this open question, see Jack H. Friedenthal, The Crack in the Steel Case, 68 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 258, 264-65 (2000) ("It is possible to read [Steel Co.] as concerning only those
jurisdictional limitations regarding the need for a case or controversy and not concerning
constitutional limits on jurisdictions, such as the need for at least minimal diversity of
citizenship."); Idleman, supra note 3, at 322 (noting the "disagreement over the extent to
which the Steel Co. mandate applies to non-Article III jurisdictional questions."); Joan
Steinman, After Steel Co.: "Hypothetical Jurisdiction" in the Federal Appellate Courts, 58
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 855, 860-62 (2001).
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issues en route to the merits.54  This interpretation is not clear. Other
language in the opinion appears to contemplate a more comprehensive ban
on the bypassing of all subject-matter jurisdiction questions. 55
Federal courts thought Steel Co. was a sea change, insofar as it elevated
structural concerns over judicial pragmatism for the purposes of rendering a
decision. Some courts read Steel Co. broadly to ordain a strict sequencing
of judicial business whereby subject-matter jurisdiction is always and ever
the antecedent inquiry.56 On this reading, the primacy of subject-matter
jurisdiction relegates even those issues that do not implicate the underlying
merits of an action to a secondary position on the decisional line.57 In
reality, however, Steel Co. was simply a warning for federal courts to take
notice and adhere to constitutionally mandated structural limits before
adjudication of the merits, and it was followed a year later by a decision of
greater significance and consequence.
2. Ruhrgas
It took the Supreme Court just one Term to provide the pragmatic
counterpoint to Steel Co. In Ruhrgas, the Court clarified the scope of Steel
Co. by recognizing that federal courts may dismiss an action on
straightforward grounds of personal jurisdiction when the subject-matter
jurisdiction question is unusually novel or complex.58 The Court, however,
54. See, e.g., Restoration Pres. Masonry Inc. v. Grove Eur. Ltd., 325 F.3d 54, 60 (1st
Cir. 2003) (bypassing the subject-matter jurisdiction issue because "the question invokes
statutory jurisdiction"); Fama v. Comm'r of Corr. Servs., 235 F.3d 804, 816 n.1 1 (2d Cir.
2000) ("[T]he Supreme Court has barred the assumption of 'hypothetical jurisdiction' only
where the potential lack of jurisdiction is a constitutional question.").
55. See, e.g., Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101 ("The statutory and (especially) constitutional
elements of jurisdiction are an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of
powers."). In 2005, the Supreme Court appeared to have adopted a reading of Steel Co. that
foreclosed hypothetical jurisdiction when either statutory or constitutional subject-matter
jurisdiction is implicated. See Tenet v. Doe, 125 S. Ct. 1230, 1235 n.4 (2005)
(acknowledging that a question of statutory subject-matter jurisdiction predicated on the
Tucker Act "is the kind of jurisdictional issue that Steel Co. directs must be resolved before
addressing the merits of a claim.").
56. See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211, 218 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(holding that, per Steel Co., personal jurisdiction does not constitute a permissible basis for
dismissal in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction), rev'd, 526 U.S. 574 (1999).
57. See Idleman, supra note 9, at 7-8 (positing that the range of possible non-merits
issues includes personal or in rem jurisdiction, Eleventh Amendment immunity, and
administrative exhaustion). Professor Scott C. Idleman notes that such issues are difficult to
categorize because
[o]n the one hand, they are not inherently related to the merits, so reaching them
prior to addressing subject-matter jurisdiction would not appear to offend Steel Co.
insofar as the merits are left unadjudged. On the other hand, many of them are not
wholly or paradigmatically jurisdictional, let alone constitutive of Article III, so
that reaching them under such circumstances would still be wielding judicial
authority neither in the presence of verified subject-matter jurisdiction nor in an
effort to verify such jurisdiction.
Id. at 8.
58. See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 588.
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was careful to preserve the notion, articulated in Steel Co., that, in the
majority of cases, a federal court should turn first to subject-matter
jurisdiction before dismissing on other grounds. 59 The Court's primary
concern in this regard was that an overeager district court, hearing a case on
removal, might infringe upon the dignity of the state court by issuing
preclusive holdings on the matter of personal jurisdiction. 60 The basic
effect of the Ruhrgas holding, however, was to preserve the federal courts'
flexibility to order jurisdictional questions for practical purposes of
efficiency and expedience. 61
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court, began her
analysis in Ruhrgas by disclaiming the theory of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. That court relegated personal jurisdiction to a
sequential position behind subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis of the
different constitutional functions served by the two inquiries and the
codified procedural requirements that underscore these differences. 62 The
Court noted that subject-matter jurisdiction serves institutional interests by
delimiting federal courts and recited the now-familiar manifestations of this
importance: non-waivability by the parties and self-monitoring by the
courts. 63  Personal jurisdiction requirements, by contrast, serve as an
external check on the court's power, protecting the individual liberty
interests of defendants from an overextension of judicial power in
accordance with the Due Process Clause. 64 As the Court observed, this
requirement is waivable 65 and is not policed by the courts sua sponte. 66
Partly on the basis of these procedural distinctions, the Fifth Circuit
prioritized subject-matter jurisdiction over the personal jurisdiction
inquiry. 67
While it acknowledged different functions served by the two doctrines,
the Supreme Court rejected the idea that "subject-matter jurisdiction is ever
and always the more 'fundamental."' ' 68 Personal jurisdiction, according to
the Court, is "'an essential element of the jurisdiction of a district...
court,"' because a court is "'powerless to proceed to an adjudication"' in its
absence.69 Thus, the Supreme Court reasoned, relegation of the personal
jurisdiction inquiry to a secondary position on the decisional line would
59. See id. at 587-88.
60. See id. at 585-88.
61. See id. at 586-88.
62. Id. at 583.
63. Id.; see supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
64. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584.
65. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1) (stating that a lack of personal jurisdiction defense may
be waived); see also Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 703 (1982) ("Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an
individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived.").
66. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584.
67. Id. at 583.
68. Id. at 584.
69. Id. (quoting Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U.S. 374, 382 (1937)).
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serve to frustrate the purposes of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 70
Furthermore, the Court noted that there are circumstances where the alleged
basis for asserting a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is purely statutory
and not dictated by constitutional command, while the personal jurisdiction
inquiry hinges "on the constitutional safeguard of due process to stop the
court from proceeding to the merits of the case." 71  Ruhrgas presented
exactly this scenario: Marathon's basis for arguing the lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction was predicated on the lack of complete diversity required
by 28 U.S.C. § 1332, but not required by Article 111.72
Yet, the Court was careful not to go too far in authorizing a jurisdictional
free-for-all whereby a federal court might enjoy unlimited discretion to
reach the personal jurisdiction issue first. 73 Justice Ginsburg limited the
discretion of federal courts in this regard to circumstances where the
personal jurisdiction issue is "straightforward" and presents "no complex
question of state law" and "the alleged defect in subject-matter jurisdiction
raises a difficult and novel question. '74 When these circumstances are not
met, the federal court enjoys no discretion to order the issues, and a
decision to reach the personal jurisdiction question first is inappropriate.
This requirement is grounded on two concerns. First, the Court noted that
"in most instances subject-matter jurisdiction will involve no arduous
inquiry," suggesting that resolution of that question first is the more
efficient course of action.75 Second, federalism concerns come to light
when the personal jurisdiction issue poses a difficult state law issue. 76 A
70. As a member of the Court intimated during the oral argument in Ruhrgas, the
protections provided by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are ill-served by a policy that
requires even a foreign defendant like Ruhrgas with no connection to a judicial forum to
vigorously litigate a complex issue of subject-matter jurisdiction at great cost. See Transcript
of Oral Argument at 25, Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. 574 (No. 98-470), available at 1999 WL 183813.
71. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 587-88.
74. Id. at 588; see also Foslip Pharms., Inc. v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 891,
899 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (reaching personal jurisdiction first where the subject-matter
jurisdiction inquiry is a complex question of fraudulent joinder).
75. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 587.
76. Federal courts may exercise personal jurisdiction when the defendant "could be
subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state in which the district
court is located." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). Therefore, the question of personal jurisdiction
faced by the district court is identical to that of the state courts: whether the long-arm statute
of the state and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment confer jurisdiction
over the defendant. For easy questions, a district court determination poses no problem. The
state court judges would arrive at the same conclusion, regardless of preclusion. Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg determined that Ruhrgas posed an easy case because the Texas long-
arm statute is coextensive with the Due Process Clause. Cf Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584.
Therefore, resolution of personal jurisdiction entailed no searching inquiry into the Texas
state requirements. Where, however, a state long-arm statute is more restrictive than the
federal Due Process Clause, there is a greater chance that the federal court may reach a
different conclusion as to personal jurisdiction than the state court. As one commentator has
noted, personal jurisdiction determinations may vary from judge to judge and, thus, "what
appears to be a clear lack of personal jurisdiction to a federal judge may appear more
complex to a state judge who might be more aggressive in her exercise of personal
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dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction carries issue preclusive effect
against relitigation of that issue in state court.77 Accordingly, courts should
not undertake analysis of state laws "in a context that the state's courts have
not yet examined or that clearly involves significant policy choices not yet
made by the forum's courts. '78 Justice Ginsburg sought to assuage fears
that the federalism concerns take precedence even in those instances where
personal jurisdiction is more straightforward and more readily resolved than
subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court explained that the intrusion into state
court business for purposes of judicial economy is not overly problematic
because the "federal and state courts are complimentary systems for
administering justice in our Nation." 79 Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg trusts
the district courts to make "sensitive judgments" in this regard that comply
with the principles of "cooperation and comity" that are so "essential to the
federal design." 80
Taken together, Steel Co. and Ruhrgas explore the bounds of judicial
pragmatism in the face of strict structural requirements. It is important to
note, however, that the holdings speak to different classes of judicial action.
Steel Co. is the restrictive reaction to the impermissible circumvention of
external limits to federal court authority. It stands for the principles of
separation of powers and federalism as against the pragmatism of
hypothetical jurisdiction. Ruhrgas is the fairer acknowledgment of the true
balance between core jurisdictional requirements and judicial pragmatism:
a federal court possesses the flexibility to dismiss cases in a way that
maximizes efficiency so long as the court does not settle the merits of the
dispute. Ruhrgas's limitation of federal court discretion to cases where
subject-matter jurisdiction is the more complex question is a sensible policy
choice. Where limits imposed by Article III are not implicated, the courts
should turn first to the easier question. Thus, subject-matter jurisdiction is
jurisdiction." Michael J. Edney, Comment, Preclusive Abstention: Issue Preclusion and
Jurisdictional Dismissals After Ruhrgas, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 193, 200 (2001). This, then, is
the basis for the Court's concern for the dignity interest of the state: the ability to fully
articulate the true reach of its own long-arm statute.
77. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585 (citing Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n., 283
U.S. 522, 524-27 (1931)). Issue preclusion operates to attach finality to a court's judgment
on a particular issue that has been "actually and necessarily determined." See Montana v.
United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). Therefore, relitigation of the personal jurisdiction
issue in state court would be barred by this determination. By issuing a Ruhrgas dismissal
on personal jurisdiction, the district court sidesteps the possibility that the case suffers for
want of subject-matter jurisdiction, a judgment that does not generally implicate relitigation
in state court. But see Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585-86 (discussing the preclusive effect of
federal court dismissals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction
on subsequent state court relitigation).
78. 4 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1063.1
(3d ed. 2002). In Ruhrgas, the plaintiff argued that, especially in cases on removal, a district
court's personal jurisdiction decision may infringe upon the responsibility of state courts to
formulate their own rulings on personal jurisdiction. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585; see supra
note 77.
79. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 586.
80. Id. at 586-87.
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not at the top of a non-merits hierarchy. Instead, courts should first turn to
it when efficiency and comity concerns so dictate.
C. Federal Court Decisions Construing Ruhrgas to Promote Judicial
Flexibility
While Ruhrgas may be read narrowly to implicate the single issue of
whether a court may dismiss an action for want of personal jurisdiction
without confirmation of subject-matter jurisdiction,8 1 this Note argues that
the analysis in Ruhrgas suggests a general approach to handling a variety of
non-merits issues. 82 This view is supported by recent federal court opinions
that construe Ruhrgas broadly so as to preserve and enhance judicial
flexibility to choose among myriad threshold grounds for denying audience
to a case on the merits.83 By and large, opinions that cite to Ruhrgas do so
to justify dismissal on grounds of personal jurisdiction where the court has
avoided a difficult question of subject-matter jurisdiction. 84 However, the
courts have validated Ruhrgas dismissals on a range of non-merits issues.
As a preliminary matter, it is essential that the courts properly classify the
basis for their dismissal. One commentator has suggested that three
categories of issues may be identified after Steel Co. 85  The first is
comprised of those core subject-matter jurisdictional issues that cannot be
81. The Fifth Circuit held that Ruhrgas excepts only personal jurisdiction from the
general requirement that subject-matter jurisdiction must be settled first. See Dominguez-
Cota v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 396 F.3d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 2005) ("We disagree with
Appellee that the Supreme Court's holding [in Ruhrgas] can be stretched to encompass 'non-
merits' issues, other than jurisdiction, such as forum non conveniens."); cf id at 653 ("In
Ruhrgas, the Court reinforced Steel Co.'s holding, but relaxed it with respect to personal
jurisdiction."). This case is discussed at supra Part II.B.2.
82. At least one commentator has argued that the Supreme Court's analysis of personal
jurisdiction in Ruhrgas may be applied to a range of issues. See, e.g., Idleman, supra note 9,
at 11. The Ruhrgas holding itself appears to indicate that there are issues, in addition to
personal jurisdiction, that may serve to pretermit a decision as to subject-matter jurisdiction.
See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584 (classifying personal jurisdiction among multiple "non-merits
grounds"); id at 585 ("It is hardly novel for a federal court to choose among threshold
grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.").
83. See, e.g., McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 127 n.17 (1st Cir. 2005) ("The thrust
of Ruhrgas was to increase judicial flexibility, not to decrease it."); N.J. TV Corp. v. FCC,
393 F.3d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("The priority for jurisdictional issues, however, doesn't
control the sequence in which we resolve non-merits issues that prevent us from reaching the
merits."); Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 2003)
("Ruhrgas reaffirms the inherent flexibility that federal courts exercise 'to choose among
threshold grounds' for disposing of a case without reaching the merits.").
84. See, e.g., Lolavar v. De Santibanes, 430 F.3d 221, 227-28 (4th Cir. 2005); Cent.
States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World Corp., 230 F.3d 934, 939
n.2 (7th Cir. 2000); Alpine View Co. Ltd. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 213-14 (5th Cir.
2000); In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F. Supp. 2d 539, 574-75
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); Maranga v. Vira, 386 F. Supp. 2d 299, 302 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Nahigian
v. Leonard, 233 F. Supp. 2d 151, 171 (D. Mass. 2002); Foslip Pharms., Inc. v. Metabolife
Int'l, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 891, 899 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
85. See Idleman, supra note 3, at 321-25. The Third Circuit adopted this basic
categorical scheme in order to properly classify forum non conveniens. See Malay. Int'l
Shipping Corp. v. Sinochem Int'l Co. Ltd., 436 F.3d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 2006).
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bypassed en route to the merits. 86 The second category contains merits-
related issues, including cause of action questions, that cannot be addressed
before subject-matter jurisdiction as they could have been under
hypothetical jurisdiction.87 A federal court may issue a decision on the
merits at a number of stages in the pleading process.88 Merits-based
decisions include a dismissal for failure to state a claim,89 a dismissal on
summary judgment, 90 and, of course, resolution of the underlying factual
dispute at trial. 91  In addition, according to Steel Co., a court's
determination that the plaintiff has failed to state a "valid (as opposed to
arguable) cause of action" is a decision on the merits. 92 Finally, the third
category is comprised of issues that fall somewhere between the first two. 93
This includes those non-Article III jurisdictional issues that Steel Co. did
not intend to include in its repudiation of subject-matter jurisdiction. 94 It
also includes an array of "procedural, remedial, or evidentiary" issues that
are neither jurisdictional nor merits related. 95 If an issue falls within this
amorphous third category, the Supreme Court has indicated that the issue is
at least a candidate for a Ruhrgas dismissal. 96
86. See Idleman, supra note 3, at 321. There is some disagreement as to whether this
category is comprised solely of constitution-based subject-matter jurisdiction issues, such as
Article III standing, or if all subject-matter jurisdiction elements, both constitutional and
statutory, are implicated. See id. at 322; see also supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text
(discussing the different interpretations as to the scope of the Steel Co. holding with respect
to different sources of subject-matter jurisdiction).
87. See Idleman, supra note 3, at 321.
88. See Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 Wash. L. Rev. 643, 652-55
(2005).
89. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A dismissal for failure to state a claim is not considered a
merits-based decision if the claim is not even an arguable one. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) ("Dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
because of the inadequacy of the federal claim is proper only when the claim is 'so
insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of [the Supreme] Court, or otherwise
completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy."' (quoting Oneida Indian
Nation of N.Y. v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974))); cf Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.
678, 682-83 (1946) ("[A] suit may sometimes be dismissed for want of jurisdiction where
the alleged claim under the Constitution or federal statutes clearly appears to be immaterial
and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly
insubstantial and frivolous.").
90. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
91. See Wasserman, supra note 88 (describing these decisions and distinguishing them
from earlier non-merits-based decisions).
92. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89. A dismissal based on a court's determination that "the
claim is 'so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of [the] Court, or
otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy' is not a
merits-based decision but, rather, a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id.
(quoting Oneida Indian Nation, 414 U.S. at 666).
93. See Idleman, supra note 3, at 321-22.
94. See id. Again, however, the inclusion of nonconstitutional subject-matter
jurisdiction issues is subject to some dispute. See supra notes 51-55, 86 and accompanying
text.
95. See Idleman, supra note 3, at 322 n.364.
96. But see Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp. v. Sinochem Int'l Co. Ltd., 436 F.3d 349, 358,
363-64 (3d. Cir. 2006) (determining that forum non conveniens is a third category non-
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The Supreme Court has interpreted Ruhrgas to extend beyond personal
jurisdiction. For instance, in 2004, the Court explicitly bypassed an Article
III standing determination in order to dismiss an action on judge-made
grounds of insufficient third-party standing.97 In that case, two attorneys
invoked the rights of hypothetical indigents in order to challenge a
Michigan law that denied the appointment of appellate counsel to trial court
defendants who pled guilty.98 The Court operated under an assumption that
plaintiffs had satisfied the requirements for Article III standing and set aside
that issue.99 It then dismissed the action for the attorney-plaintiffs' failure
to demonstrate third-party standing, 100 a judicially self-imposed standing
principle.' 0 ' The case demonstrates the Court's approval of a Ruhrgas
dismissal on non-merits grounds that exist independently of either
constitutional or statutory authorization. 102
The Supreme Court also identified the common law Totten v. United
States rule of dismissal, which requires the dismissal of cases based on the
plaintiffs' secret espionage relationship with the government, 10 3 as the "sort
of 'threshold question"' on which a court may order a Ruhrgas dismissal. 104
In Tenet v. Doe, the Supreme Court briefly considered whether Steel Co.
required it to evaluate the Government-defendant's motion to dismiss for
merits issue but finding nevertheless that a court must have subject-matter jurisdiction in
order to dismiss on such grounds).
97. See Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 127-28 (2004). The third-party standing
doctrine permits an association to bring a suit on behalf of its injured members. See Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975). So long as the association demonstrates that its members
would have sufficient Article III standing had the members themselves brought the suit, "and
so long as the nature of the claim and of the relief sought does not make the individual
participation of each injured party indispensable to proper resolution of the cause, the
association may be an appropriate representative of its members, entitled to invoke the
court's jurisdiction." Id.
98. See Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 127-28.
99. See id. at 129. Notice that by "assuming" proper Article III subject-matter
jurisdiction, id., the Supreme Court suggested that it was exercising a permissible form of
"hypothetical jurisdiction," which enabled the assumption of jurisdiction in order to reach
the merits. See supra Part l.B. 1.
100. See Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 134.
101. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc.,
517 U.S. 544, 557 (1996) ("'[T]he general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's
legal rights' is a 'judicially self-imposed limi[t] on the exercise of federal jurisdiction,' not a
constitutional mandate." (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984))).
102. In this sense, Kowalski fits nicely into the Supreme Court's exception of anotherjudge-made limitation on federal judicial power, Younger abstention, from its jurisdiction-
first mandate in Steel Co. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. Kowalski also
demonstrates how a Ruhrgas dismissal can facilitate constitutional avoidance. See supra note
50. Rather than analyze whether the hypothetical indigent defendants would have sufficient
constitutional standing to challenge the constitutionality of the state statute, see Warth, 422
U.S. at 511 (requiring, inter alia, confirmation of member standing to permit third-party
representation), the Court disposed of the case on far less problematic prudential grounds.
See Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 134.
103. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876).
104. Tenet v. Doe, 125 S. Ct. 1230, 1235 n.4 (2005).
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lack of statutory subject-matter jurisdiction. 10 5 Though it recognized that
the statutory subject-matter question was the kind of jurisdictional issue that
Steel Co. requires courts to resolve before the merits, the Court concluded
that its issuance of an order of dismissal on Totten grounds was consistent
with Ruhrgas.10 6 The Court noted that the Totten rule was uniquely
designed to prevent judicial inquiry into the merits. 10 7 Thus, pursuant to
Ruhrgas, the Court identified an important interest, the preservation of
government secrets, and made a discretionary choice to dismiss on the more
straightforward, non-merits Totten grounds rather than engage in invasive
discovery or other proceedings. 108
Taking cue from Ruhrgas, the lower federal courts have shuffled
jurisdictional issues so as to reach dismissal on more easily resolved
threshold grounds where subject-matter jurisdiction is complicated. Among
those grounds are Eleventh Amendment immunity, 10 9 the absence of an
indispensable party pursuant to Rule 19,110 prudential standing,"' l
mootness, 112 the political question doctrine, 113 and forum non conveniens,
to which this Note will now turn.
105. See id. The Government claimed that, pursuant to the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1491(a)(1) (2000), the plaintiff could bring its claim only in the Court of Federal Claims. See
Tenet, 125 S. Ct. at 1235 n.4.
106. See Tenet, 125 S. Ct. at 1235 n.4.
107. See id.; see also id. at 1238 (Scalia, J., concurring) (distinguishing the Totten bar
from a "nonthreshold merits question").
108. See id. at 1235 n.4.
109. See In re Hechinger Inv. Co., 335 F.3d 243, 250-51 (3d Cir. 2003) ("[Flederal courts
are not generally obligated to address 'jurisdictional issues' in any particular order.").
110. See Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 2005) (suggesting that the
Rule 19 issue may be addressed ahead of subject-matter jurisdiction though ultimately
deciding subject-matter jurisdiction issues first). Rule 19 instructs a district court to
determine whether an action should be dismissed in the absence of a party deemed
"indispensable." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
111. See Grand Council of the Crees v. FERC, 198 F.3d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("[I]t
is entirely proper to consider whether there is prudential standing while leaving the question
of constitutional standing in doubt, as there is no mandated 'sequencing of jurisdictional
issues."' (quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999)).
112. See Kaw Nation v. Norton, 405 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("[G]enerally, we
may address jurisdictional issues in any order.").
113. See Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("[W]e need not
resolve the question of the district court's [statutory] subject-matter jurisdiction ... before
considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question.").
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II. THE MULTI-FACETED CIRCUIT-SPLIT: WEIGHING THE PROPRIETY OF A
DISMISSAL UNDER FORUM NON CONVENIENS WITHOUT RESOLUTION OF
SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION CHALLENGES
A. Determining the Appropriate Forum: The Federal Doctrine of Forum
Non Conveniens
Forum non conveniens is a common law doctrine1 14 that permits a
federal court to dismiss a cause of action even though the forum may
constitutionally assert jurisdiction. The doctrine allows a court to abstain
from otherwise sanctioned jurisdiction over a suit where it appears on
balance that the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and the interests
of justice, would be better served by adjudication in a different forum. 115
The abstention from the exercise of technically sound jurisdiction is an
operation of the inherent power of the federal courts. 116 The courts'
authority in this regard is an expression of the "judicial Power" articulated
in Article III of the Constitution l1 7 that encompasses the range of
unenumerated powers that flow from the special character or needs of a
court. 118  This section will focus on the modem development and
114. While the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens is a creature of case law, some
states have codified the doctrine in statute. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 5 (2005)
("When the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the action should be heard in
another forum, the court may stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions
that may be just.").
115. In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d 1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1987);
see also Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 528 (1947) ("[Tlhe
doctrine of forum non conveniens. .. , resists formalization and looks to the realities that
make for doing justice.").
116. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1947)); Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215, 1218 (1 1th
Cir. 1985) ("The doctrine derives from the court's inherent power, under article III of the
Constitution, to control the administration of the litigation before it and to prevent its process
from becoming an instrument of abuse, injustice and oppression."). One circuit court of
appeals classified the power to dismiss under forum non conveniens among those inherent
powers that are "necessary only in the sense of being highly useful in the pursuit of a just
result" and that "courts may exercise this kind of inherent power only in the absence of
contrary legislative direction." Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 563-64 (3d Cir.
1985) (en banc). This explanation comports with the displacement of the common law
doctrine by congressional statute to allow transfers between federal district courts under 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000). See infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
117. See U.S. Const., art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish."); id. § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases .. ").
118. See Idleman, supra note 9, at 48-50 (describing inherent powers as arising from both
historical application and institutional necessity). Inherent powers are "governed not by rule
or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to
achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370
U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962); see also Eash, 757 F.2d at 561 ("That courts have inherent
powers-powers vested in the courts upon their creation and not derived from any statute-
is not disputed.").
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application of the doctrine in federal courts, with particular attention paid to
the doctrine's flexibility.
1. The Available Alternative Forum
The Supreme Court ushered in the modem era of forum non conveniens
in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,119 where it held that "a court may resist
imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the
letter of a general venue statute."'1 20 In affirming the dismissal of a case
properly brought in New York but more appropriately adjudicated in
Virginia, 121 the Court formulated a basic test that, with some alteration,
continues to guide the federal courts' evaluation of a motion to dismiss
under forum non conveniens to this day. As a threshold matter, a federal
court must first determine the existence of an adequate alternative forum. 122
The doctrine of forum non conveniens operates to provide federal courts
with a choice of two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process:
the home forum, in which the suit is filed, and the alternative forum. 123
Accordingly, the question of dismissal should proceed no further if the
court has failed to identify an alternative forum where the defendant is
amendable to suit and which permits litigation of the subject matter of the
dispute. 124
2. The Balancing of Private and Public Interest Factors
If a court finds that an adequate alternative forum exists, it then must
determine, by balancing the private interests of the parties and the public
interest concerns of the court, whether adjudication of the substantive claim
in the original, chosen forum would be inconvenient and unjust. 125 In
Gilbert, the Supreme Court for the first time enunciated a set of factors to
guide the federal courts in making this determination. 126 Evaluation of
these factors might indicate the "exceptional circumstance[]" when a court
should exercise its power to decline jurisdiction by dismissing under forum
non conveniens.127 The Court, however, imbued the doctrine with
considerable flexibility and noted that it did not attempt to establish an
exhaustive list of potentially dispositive circumstances. 28 Instead, the
Supreme Court left decisions as to the weight and importance of the various
119. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
120. Id. at 507.
121. Note that this function, the dismissal of an action in favor of a more suitable forum
in another federal district court, is no longer within the operation of forum non conveniens
after the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). See infra text accompanying notes 143-47.
122. See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 506-07.
123. Id. at 507.
124. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981); Gilbert, 330 U.S. at
506-07.
125. See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 504.
128. Id. at 508.
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factors to the discretion of the court to which a plaintiff resorts. 129 The
Gilbert Court, however, did impose one important limit on the power of the
courts to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens when it mandated
that, "unless the balance [of the articulated factors] is strongly in favor of
the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed."' 130
Thus, defendants usually have the burden of overcoming a strong
presumption in favor of a plaintiff s choice of forum.' 3'
The first set of considerations outlined by the Supreme Court in Gilbert
speaks to the private interest of the litigants. 132 The Court found that
[i]mportant considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of
proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and
the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view
of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforcibility of a
judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh relative advantages and
obstacles to fair trial. It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice
of an inconvenient forum, "vex," "harass," or "oppress" the defendant by
inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to his own right to
pursue his remedy. 133
The Court then turned to the "public interest" factors, which include
administrative difficulties relating to court congestion, the imposition of
local jury duty on citizens of the forum, the interest in settling local disputes
locally, and the avoidance of complex problems associated with the
application of foreign law. 134
3. Later Refinements to Forum Non Conveniens
While the Gilbert Court placed a heavy burden on the defendant in
overcoming the plaintiffs initial choice of forum, the Supreme Court later
determined that a foreign plaintiffs choice of forum is entitled to less
deference. 135 The Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno Court emphasized that this
rule is not intended to disadvantage foreign plaintiffs that pursue remedies
in United States courts.1 36 Rather, the modification reflects a logical
prediction of the ultimate convenience of the forum.137 Relying on the
underlying consideration of relative convenience in the forum non
conveniens inquiry, the Court noted that "[w]hen the home forum has been
chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient," but "this
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1981).
132. See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 508-09.





assumption is much less reasonable" when the plaintiff is foreign to the
forum. 138 The Court also held that, ordinarily, courts should not give
substantive weight to the possibility that adjudication in the alternative
forum might expose a plaintiffs claim to an unfavorable change in law. 139
This reflects sensible policy. If the plaintiff had a choice of forums, it is
reasonable to assume that she filed suit in the forum with law most
favorable to her claim. 140 This also avoids the messy comparative law
analysis that the forum non conveniens doctrine was designed to avoid. 141
These modifications were intended to make forum non conveniens a more
valuable weapon to combat forum shopping by foreign plaintiffs.' 42
The decision in Piper reflects the practical constraints of the more limited
application of the forum non conveniens dismissal, which applies only "in
cases where the alternative forum is abroad."' 143 The restriction of the
common law doctrine is the work of Congress, which only a year after the
Gilbert decision enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 144 This statute permits a
federal court to transfer a civil action to another federal district court "[f]or
the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice."' 145
While the early use of the doctrine in federal courts contemplated the
dismissal of an action in favor of any forum, including transfer to another
federal court, 146 Congress superseded the intra-district function of forum
non conveniens by investing the courts with the statutory power to effect
transfer of venue. 147
138. Id.
139. See id. at 247.
140. See id. at 250.
141. See id. at 251 ("The doctrine offorum non conveniens, however, is designed in part
to help courts avoid conducting complex exercises in comparative law. As we stated in
Gilbert, the public interest factors point towards dismissal where the court would be required
to 'untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself."' (quoting Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947))).
142. For a more comprehensive review of Piper and the fight against forum-shopping, see
Megan Waples, Note, The Adequate Alternative Forum Analysis in Forum Non Conveniens:
A Case for Reform, 36 Conn. L. Rev. 1475 (2004).
143. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 n.2 (1994).
144. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 722 (1996) ("The dispute in
Gulf Oil was over venue, not jurisdiction, and the expectation was that after dismissal of the
suit in New York the parties would refile in federal court, not the state courts of Virginia.
This transfer of venue function of theforum non conveniens doctrine has been superseded by
statute."); Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955) ("The harshest result of the
application of the old doctrine of forum non conveniens, dismissal of the action, was
eliminated by the provision in § 1404(a) for transfer . .
145. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000).
146. Indeed, Gilbert involved the dismissal of an action in New York where that action
was more properly adjudicated in Virginia. See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 511-12.
147. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 253 (1981). While some modem
courts refer to a dismissal of an action pursuant to forum non conveniens as a "transfer," see,
e.g., Rivendell Forest Prods. v. Can. Pac. Ltd., 2 F.3d 990, 994 n.7 (10th Cir. 1993), a court
cannot actually transfer a case to the courts of another country. See David W. Robertson, The
Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens: "An Object Lesson in Uncontrolled
Discretion, " 29 Tex. Int'l L.J. 353, 370 (1994). Courts, however, have developed the
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Since Piper, the lower federal courts have generally followed the same
procedure in addressing forum non conveniens motions: (1) assess the level
of deference due the plaintiffs choice of forum, with a lesser degree of
deference paid to foreign plaintiffs; (2) determine the existence of an
available, alternative forum; and (3) weigh the private and public interest
factors as originally outlined in Gilbert and modified by Piper.148 Courts
have also developed the practice of issuing forum non conveniens
dismissals that are contingent on various factors, 149 including the
submission of the defendant to the jurisdiction of the alternative forum 150 or
defendant's waiver of a statute of limitation defense, if the cause of action is
no longer timely in the alternative forum.' 5 1  Despite the deferential
adjustments made by the Piper Court, the essential attribute of modem
forum non conveniens, at least from the bench's perspective, is flexibility,
for it affords courts an array of tools for comparative analysis without a
rigid structural framework.
B. Forum Non Conveniens: Merits or Not (and Does It Even Matter?)
This section will introduce the complicated split among the circuit courts
of appeals as to the propriety of dismissing a case under forum non
conveniens without confirmation of the court's jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the dispute. There are two general fault lines running through
these decisions. The first speaks to the categorization of forum non
conveniens as a merits or non-merits issue. As this Note examined in Part
I, this determination is crucial, for the federal courts generally are forbidden
from issuing a decision on the merits in the absence of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Thus, the pragmatic benefits conferred by forum non
conveniens, including not insignificant savings for the litigants in terms of
jurisdictional discovery costs and for the courts in terms of docket
management, do not outweigh the structural bounds that limit the reach of
the federal courts so long as the doctrine is classified as a merits-based
issue. This split implicates subject-matter jurisdiction's role as a structural
technique of "conditional dismissal," which makes the forum non conveniens dismissal
contingent on various factors. See infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
149. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 257 n.25 ("[D]istrict courts might dismiss subject to the
condition that defendant corporations agree to provide the records relevant to the plaintiff's
claims."); Baris v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 932 F.2d 1540, 1551 (5th Cir. 1991) ("[C]ourts must
take measures, as part of the their dismissals in forum non conveniens cases, to ensure that
defendants will not attempt to evade the jurisdiction of the foreign courts."). See also
Alexander Reus, Judicial Discretion: A Comparative View of the Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, 16 Loy. L.A. Int'l &
Comp. L.J. 455, 473-74 (1994) (noting that conditional dismissals have been used as
justification for a more liberal application of the doctrine despite evidence that such
dismissals remain outcome determinative).
150. See, e.g., Zermeno v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 246 F. Supp. 2d 646, 659 (S.D.
Tex. 2003).
151. See, e.g., Usha (India), Ltd. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 421 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir.
2005).
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requirement. The second fault line was introduced, at least in the
sequencing context, by the Third Circuit in 2006.152 This concern focuses
more fundamentally on whether a court may properly evaluate the merits of
a motion to dismiss under forum non conveniens without antecedent
confirmation of the court's jurisdiction. Phrased another way, is a court
capable of weighing the appropriateness of the two forums if it is not
certain that, if it declined to abstain, it could even render a final judgment at
all? This aspect of the split concerns the court's elemental requirements for
the application of the forum non conveniens doctrine. 153
1. Papandreou and Monde Re: Casting Forum Non Conveniens as a Non-
merits Issue
In In re Minister Papandreou,154 the D.C. Circuit considered the
defendants' petition for a writ of mandamus requesting vacatur of a district
court's discovery order. 155 The discovery was designed to enable the
court's evaluation of the defendants' assertion that the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 ("FSIA") 156 barred jurisdiction over the dispute.157
The defendants argued on appeal that the district court should have
considered defendants' motions to dismiss on less onerous grounds,
including forum non conveniens. 158 The D.C. Circuit agreed with the
defendant and issued the writ because the district court's evaluation of these
defenses, each of which it considered "jurisdictional or hav[ing]
jurisdictional overtones," might have resulted in considerable cost and time
savings for the foreign defendants. 159 The court noted that its classification
of these grounds as at least quasi-jurisdictional was essential given the
Supreme Court's mandate that merits issues may not be settled while
subject-matter jurisdiction is in doubt. 160  Because the FSIA question
implicated the court's statutory authority to resolve the dispute, 16 1 the
district court was permitted to address only non-merits issues, and dismiss
thereupon, without settling the FSIA controversy. 162 The D.C. Circuit
152. See infra Part II.B.3.b.
153. If the Third Circuit is correct that subject-matter jurisdiction is a prerequisite for the
exercise of a court's inherent power to dismiss under forum non conveniens, then the federal
court's procedure might change. See supra text accompanying note 148. Before assessing
the level of deference paid to the plaintiffs choice of forum or the availability of the
alternative forum, the court must satisfy itself of its jurisdiction over the dispute.
154. 139 F.3d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
155. Id. at 249-50.
156. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (2000).
157. See Papandreou, 139 F.3d at 249-50.
158. See id. at 249, 254.
159. Id. at 254.
160. See id. at 254-55 (citing, inter alia, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S.
83, 94 (1998)).
161. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 433-34
(1989) (discussing the impact of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") on the
jurisdiction of the federal courts).
162. See Papandreou, 139 F.3d at 255.
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determined that a dismissal under forum non conveniens does not constitute
a decision on the merits. 163 It noted that forum non conveniens "instead
involves a deliberate abstention from the exercise of jurisdiction."' 164 The
court considered such a dismissal "as merits-free as a finding of no
jurisdiction."' 165 The D.C. Circuit did inject some measure of limitation into
the equation when it held that a district court's order dismissing under
forum non conveniens without resolution of subject-matter jurisdiction
could not be subject to conditions, "for exaction of such a condition would
appear inescapably to constitute an exercise of jurisdiction."' 166
The D.C. Circuit's classification of the doctrine was borrowed four years
later by the Second Circuit when it approved the dismissal under forum non
conveniens of an action brought to enforce a foreign arbitral award in
Monegasque de Reassurances (Monde Re) v. Naz Nafiogaz.167 In Monde
Re, the district court considered, inter alia, the merits of a sovereign
defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of statutory subject-matter
jurisdiction pursuant to immunities located in the FSIA and its motion to
dismiss under forum non conveniens.168 After considering the adequacy of
Ukraine as an alternative forum and finding that both the private and public
interest factors weighed heavily in favor of dismissal, the court granted
Ukraine's motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens without
settling the FSIA immunity question. 169 The Second Circuit affirmed the
dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds, despite the plaintiffs
argument that the district court was required to address the subject-matter
jurisdiction issue raised by the defendant's motion. 170 While the Second
Circuit conceded that "the first question for an appellate court ordinarily is
that of its jurisdiction,"' 17 1 it relied on Papandreoul72 for its holding that
"neither [it] nor the district court are barred from passing over the question
163. See id. at 255. The D.C. Circuit stated, "[A] court that dismisses on other non-merits
grounds such as forum non conveniens and personal jurisdiction, before finding subject-
matter jurisdiction, makes no assumption of law-declaring power that violates the separation
of powers principles .... Id The Supreme Court quoted this language, absent the
reference to forum non conveniens, from Papandreou to support its holding that personal
jurisdiction may be addressed before a difficult question of subject-matter jurisdiction. See
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1999).
164. Papandreou, 139 F.3d at 255. The D.C. Circuit drew a comparison to a similar
abstention from a potentially nonexistent jurisdiction that the Supreme Court had expressly
approved: the discretionary declination of pendent jurisdiction that may not have otherwise
existed. See id. at 255-56 (citing Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 100 n.3).
165. Id. at 255.
166. Id. at 256 n.6. For more on conditional dismissals on the ground of forum non
conveniens, see supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
167. 311 F.3d 488, 497-98 (2d Cir. 2002).
168. See id. at 493.
169. See id.
170. Id. at 497.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 498 (citing In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255-56 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). The
Second Circuit was not alone in relying on Papandreou. The First Circuit also drew upon
the D.C. Circuit's holding to classify forum non conveniens among a set of "non-merits-
based defenses." Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Org., 402 F.3d 274, 294 (1st Cir. 2005).
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of jurisdiction and going directly to the forum non convenien[s] issue raised
by Ukraine."' 73
2. Dominguez-Cota: Forum Non Conveniens and the Entanglement with
the Merits
At this time, only the Fifth Circuit has characterized forum non
conveniens as a merits issue in the present context. 174 In Dominguez-Cota
v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co.,1 75 the defendants removed a state tort action
to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi
on diversity grounds, apparently arguing that the joinder of one of the
defendants was improper, and immediately moved for dismissal under
forum non conveniens. 176 Before addressing the plaintiffs' motion for
remand on the basis that subject-matter jurisdiction was defective for lack
of complete diversity, the district court granted the defendants' motion for
dismissal. 177  On appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's
dismissal and held, inter alia, that forum non conveniens does not qualify as
a threshold issue and, instead, is an inquiry into the merits that must await
resolution of the plaintiffs' challenge to the court's jurisdiction. 78
In Dominguez-Cota, the Fifth Circuit concluded that a forum non
conveniens analysis entails review of the particular facts of the case, and,
therefore, the court must reach the merits. 179 The Fifth Circuit based its
holding on Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, where the Supreme Court
considered whether forum non conveniens falls within the collateral-order
doctrine.180 The collateral-order doctrine requires, inter alia, that the issue
173. Monde Re, 311 F.3d at 497-98.
174. At least one district court has suggested, by parenthetical reference to Steel Co., that
forum non conveniens is a merits inquiry and, therefore, may not be addressed before
subject-matter jurisdiction due to the Supreme Court's repudiation of hypothetical
jurisdiction. See O'Neill v. St. Jude Med., Inc., No. Civ. 04-1211, 2004 WL 1765335, at *1
n.4 (D. Minn. Aug. 5, 2004).
175. 396 F.3d 650 (5th Cir. 2005).
176. Id. at 651-52.
177. See id. at 652.
178. Id. at 653-54.
179. See id. at 654 ("For example, the court, in evaluating the 'private factors' must
review the evidence in order to determine whether or not it will be accessible in the
respective forums and consider the fairness of litigating in the respective forums and
evaluate the difficulty of litigating the case in a forum which has few contacts with the
litigants or with the accident.").
180. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 527 (1988). As a general rule, a party
may not take an appeal to a federal appellate court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) until the
district court has rendered a final decision that ends litigation on the merits. Biard, 486 U.S.
at 521. However, in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), the
Supreme Court "recognized a 'small class' of decisions that are immediately appealable
under § 1291 even though the decision has not terminated the proceedings in the district
court." Biard, 486 U.S. at 522. The collateral-order doctrine
emphasizes the deference that appellate courts owe to the trial judge as the
individual initially called upon to decide the many questions of law and fact that
occur in the course of a trial. Permitting piecemeal appeals would undermine the
independence of the district judge, as well as the special role that individual plays
3172 [Vol. 74
THE FORUM NON CONVENIENS DISMISSAL
on which the district court's decision rests is separate from the underlying
merits of the dispute. 181 In Biard, the Supreme Court held that, when
determining the second prong of the forum non conveniens test-evaluation
of the private and public interest factors-a court "becomes entangled in the
merits of the underlying dispute."' 182 As a result, an order denying a motion
to dismiss for forum non conveniens is not a collateral order pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291.183 The Fifth Circuit borrowed the classification of forum
non conveniens under the collateral-order doctrine in order to characterize
the doctrine for purposes of issue sequencing.' 84 As a result, the court was
"unable to characterize forum non conveniens as a 'non-merits' issue" and
remanded to the district court for evaluation of the plaintiffs' challenge to
that court's subject-matter jurisdiction.185
The primary distinction between the holding of the Fifth Circuit and
those of the D.C. and Second Circuits is the basis for the categorization of
an issue as "on the merits." The Fifth Circuit concentrated on a court's
means of evaluating a forum non conveniens motion.186 Because the merits
are embodied in the facts of a dispute and the consideration of a forum non
conveniens motion necessitates consideration of these facts, the court
"'becomes entangled in the merits."' 187  The D.C. Circuit took a more
result-oriented tack in analyzing the issue, comparing an abstention on
grounds of forum non conveniens to a finding of no jurisdiction. 188 The
court implied that, because the mere evaluation of the facts of a dispute
does not entail resolving that dispute, the consideration of the facts relevant
to a forum non conveniens motion does not render that evaluation a merits-
based inquiry.' 8 9 At the time of the Fifth Circuit's ruling in 2005, it
appeared that the classification issue was the only major dispute among the
circuit courts as to the propriety of a Ruhrgas dismissal for forum non
in our judicial system. In addition, the rule is in accordance with the sensible
policy of "avoid[ing] the obstruction to just claims that would come from
permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals from the
various rulings to which a litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of
judgment."
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) (quoting Cobbledick v.
United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940)) (alteration in original).
181. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
182. Biard, 486 U.S. at 528; see also id. at 529 ("We believe that in the main, the issues
that arise in forum non conveniens determinations will substantially overlap factual and legal
issues of the underlying dispute, making such determinations unsuited for immediate appeal
as of right under § 1291.").
183. Id. at 530. This result is not as harsh as it appears. The Supreme Court noted that,
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), a district court may certify a nonfinal order for interlocutory
review for reasons of judicial economy. Id. at 529-30. Thus, a district court may certify the
denial of a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens and a court of appeals, pursuant to
its discretion, may review the order. Id. at 530.
184. Dominguez-Cota v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 396 F.3d 650, 654 (5th Cir. 2005).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 654.
187. Id. (quoting Biard, 486 U.S. at 528).
188. In re Minister Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
189. Id.
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conveniens. As Part II.B.3 explains, however, the Third Circuit injected a
new wrinkle into the debate in 2006.
3. Sinochem: Non-merits? Yes. . . but Subject-Matter Jurisdiction is
Required Nevertheless
In Malaysia International Shipping Corp. v. Sinochem International
Co., 190 the Third Circuit assessed the propriety of the district court's
decision to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds without resolution of
a personal jurisdiction challenge as opposed to a subject-matter jurisdiction
question. 191 This distinction does not fundamentally change the analysis.
The Third Circuit groups both personal jurisdiction and subject-matter
jurisdiction under the heading of "jurisdictional issues" and refers to the
dispute encapsulated in the holdings in Papandreou and Monde Re and the
holding in Dominguez-Cota as the circuit split "on the issue."'1 92 Moreover,
the fundamental question is the same in all four circuits-whether a federal
district court must establish a jurisdictional prerequisite before dismissing
on grounds of forum non conveniens. 193
a. Forum Non Conveniens Is a Non-merits Issue
At the outset, the Third Circuit's analysis parsed the holdings of the
prevailing circuit split. It concluded that the Fifth Circuit's "entanglement
theory" did not suffice to render forum non conveniens a merits-related
issue. 194 The court drew primary support for this reasoning from federal
court opinions that assessed the character of the forum non conveniens
inquiry in a context other than the collateral-order doctrine. 195 Initially, the
Third Circuit discussed the non-preclusive effect of a dismissal for forum
non conveniens on the relitigation of the same underlying claim in another
court and the impact of this distinction upon the classification of the
doctrine as merits related. A dismissal under forum non conveniens
establishes neither claim nor issue preclusion because the convenience
issues, as embodied by the private and public interest factors, 196 are
intrinsically different in other courts. 197 To illustrate this principle, the
190. 436 F.3d 349 (3d Cir. 2006).
191. Id. at 358.
192. Id.; see also id. at 361 (consolidating subject-matter and personal jurisdiction under
the term "jurisdiction").
193. Id. at 361.
194. See id. at 360; see also Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 932 F.2d 170, 181 (3d Cir.
1991) (holding that, although "the district court must immerse itself to a certain degree in the
facts of the case[,] ... [it] must do no more than delineate the likely contours of the case by
ascertaining, among other things, the nature of the plaintiff's action, the existence of any
potential defenses, and the essential sources of proof").
195. Sinochem, 436 F.3d at 359-60.
196. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
197. See Parsons v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 375 U.S. 71, 73 (1963) (holding that,
because "the material facts underlying the application of [forum non conveniens] criteria in
each forum were different in several respects, principles ofresjudicata" are not transferable
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Third Circuit examined a case where the Supreme Court discussed the Anti-
Injunction Act, 198 which, absent specific circumstances, prevents federal
courts from issuing injunctions to stay proceedings in state courts. 199
There, the Supreme Court determined that a federal court could not enjoin a
subsequent proceeding brought in state court to enforce its dismissal under
federal forum non conveniens because its dismissal was not a resolution of
the merits. 200 In this context, not only was the dismissal not res judicata for
the relitigation of the underlying claim, but, because the issue of whether
the state court was an inappropriate forum was not "actually litigated" at the
federal level, the plaintiff was not barred from re-airing his claim in the
courts of the state in which the federal court sat.201 Thus, the defendant
could not rely on the federal forum non conveniens dismissal to preclude
relitigation of the same claim in state court. Because forum non conveniens
permits a court to deliberately abstain from deciding the substantive issues
presented,20 2 a federal court that dismisses on such grounds has no
discretion to preclude a second action on the same claim in another court. 20 3
Next, the Third Circuit looked to a Supreme Court opinion that again
classified forum non conveniens as a non-merits inquiry. There, the
from state to federal court); Baris v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 74 F.3d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1996)
("While f.n.c. is not a 'jurisdictional' concept, an f.n.c. dismissal follows 'the same rules' as
a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or improper venue. Moreover, such an f.n.c. dismissal,
like a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or improper venue, 'does not establish claim
preclusion'; it can work to preclude the relitigation only of the f.n.c. issue in that court."
(citations omitted)). The same basic principle applies to relitigation of the same claim in
another federal court. See Mizokami Bros. of Ariz. v. Mobay Chem. Corp., 660 F.2d 712,
715-17 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that a determination by the district court in Arizona that
litigation in that forum was not convenient was not preclusive because convenience factors
relevant to litigation in Arizona were not comparable to those relevant to litigation in
Missouri).
198. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000).
199. See Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146 (1988) ("Congress... has
permitted injunctions in certain, specific circumstances, namely, when expressly authorized
by statute, necessary in aid of the court's jurisdiction, or necessary to protect or effectuate
the court's judgment.").
200. Id. at 148. The Third Circuit also cited a Fifth Circuit opinion discussing the Anti-
Injunction Act that "held that an 'f.n.c. [forum non conveniens] dismissal ... does not
resolve the substantive merits." Sinochem, 436 F.3d at 360 (quoting Vasquez v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 325 F.3d 665, 667 (5th Cir. 2003)) (alterations in original).
201. See Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 148 ("[Tlhe only issue decided by the District
Court was that petitioner's claims should be dismissed under the federal forum non
conveniens doctrine. Federal forum non conveniens principles simply cannot determine
whether [state] courts, which operate under a broad 'open-courts' mandate, would consider
themselves an appropriate forum for petitioner's lawsuit."); id. at 149 ("[T]he [state] courts
would apply a significantly differentforum non conveniens analysis. Thus, whether the...
state courts are an appropriate forum for petitioner's [foreign] law claims has not yet been
litigated, and an injunction to foreclose consideration of that issue is not within the
relitigation exception.").
202. See Vasquez, 325 F.3d at 678-79 (noting that, because forum non conveniens
"contemplates resolving the merits in another forum... it cannot forever bar the controversy
from all American courts").
203. See 18A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 4436 (2002).
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Supreme Court termed forum non conveniens "procedural rather than
substantive." 20 4 It equated forum non conveniens to a venue provision "that
goes to process rather than substantive rights--determining which among
various competent courts will decide the case." 20 5  Later, the Court
distinguished the doctrine from issues like "burden of proof.., and
affirmative defenses such as contributory negligence... [because it] does
not bear upon the substantive right to recover." 20 6 By casting forum non
conveniens as a procedural issue, 207 the Third Circuit grouped the doctrine
among the myriad candidate non-merits grounds for preemptive
dismissal. 208
b. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Is Essential for Balancing Purposes
Based on the extent of the circuit split that existed prior to Sinochem, one
might have expected the Third Circuit's determination that forum non
conveniens is a non-merits issue to place it squarely among those circuits,
namely the D.C. and Second, that countenanced the Ruhrgas dismissal on
such grounds. However, the court moved on to analyze whether there was
something fundamental in the forum non conveniens analysis itself that
required antecedent confirmation of subject-matter jurisdiction.209 In 1947,
the Supreme Court held that "forum non conveniens can never apply if there
is absence of jurisdiction or mistake of venue" in the original forum.2 10 The
implication is that, if either subject-matter or personal jurisdiction is absent,
then the court should dismiss on those grounds without reaching the forum
non conveniens question.211 Casting jurisdiction as a prerequisite to the
exercise of forum non conveniens conflicts squarely with the Third
Circuit's determination that forum non conveniens is a non-merits inquiry.
The Third Circuit proceeded to analyze this discrepancy. 212
Initially, the Third Circuit pointed out the seeming anomaly of a court
abstaining from an exercise of jurisdiction that it does not yet possess.213
Because forum non conveniens entails a comparative analysis of two
204. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994); see also id. at 454 n.4
("[F]orum non conveniens is not a substantive right of the parties, but a procedural rule of
the forum.").
205. Id. at 453.
206. Id. at 454.
207. Procedural issues are characterized by their effect on the court's "power or authority
to entertain, hear, decide, and resolve a legal or factual dispute in favor of one party or the
other." See Wasserman, supra note 88, at 650.
208. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
209. See Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp. v. Sinochem Int'l Co., 436 F.3d 349, 361-64 (2006).
210. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947).
211. See 15 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 3828 (2d ed. 1986).
212. Notice here again that the jurisdictional issue implicated in Sinochem concerned
personal, rather than subject-matter, jurisdiction. In a footnote, the Third Circuit concluded
that use of the term "jurisdiction" in Gilbert, see supra note 210, implied both jurisdiction
over the dispute and the parties. See Sinochem, 436 U.S. at 361 n.20.
213. Sinochem, 436 U.S. at 361-62.
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jurisdictionally competent forums, 214 the Third Circuit posited that
jurisdiction is "a sine qua non for forum non conveniens."215 The case law
cited by the Third Circuit for this proposition, however, focuses more
fundamentally on the availability of the alternative forum to adjudicate the
dispute rather than the jurisdictional competence of the original forum.216
For example, the court cited a Seventh Circuit case where it vacated an
order dismissing on forum non conveniens grounds because the district
court failed to establish that the proposed alternative forum had adequate
personal jurisdiction. 217 However, there is very little explanation, aside
from the Third Circuit's sine qua non conclusion, as to why the definitive
competence of the original forum is so vital.218 Nevertheless, the court
concluded on the basis of this precedent that, because "a court can only
abstain from jurisdiction it already has, if it has no jurisdiction ipso facto it
cannot abstain from the exercise of it."'2 19
The Third Circuit then pointed to two decisions where circuit courts
vacated forum non conveniens dismissals because the district court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction.220 It looked again to the Seventh Circuit, here
for a holding in which that court severed a dispensable party 221 with
expatriate status when otherwise affirming a district court's dismissal on
forum non conveniens grounds. 222 Because the expatriate party's inclusion
214. See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 506-07; see also In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 420 F.3d
702, 704 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that "the present forum... by definition has both subject
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over all parties").
215. Sinochem, 436 F.3d at 361.
216. For instance, the court cited In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 420 F.3d 702, where the
court argued that abstention in favor of adjudication in another forum makes little sense
unless that other forum can exercise jurisdiction over the dispute and the parties. Id. at 704.
The Third Circuit also cites a federal court treatise for the premise that a court should never
reach a forum non conveniens question when either subject-matter or personal jurisdiction
are wanting and instead dismiss on those grounds. 15 Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note
211, § 3828. Notice here, however, that the treatise presupposes, for example, that the court
already has determined that it definitively lacks jurisdiction. This is different from the
situation the Third Circuit encountered in Sinochem, where the district court had never
conclusively answered the personal jurisdiction question and, thus, never determined
whether such jurisdiction was wanting. See Sinochem, 436 F.3d at 364 (remanding the case
to the district court to settle the personal jurisdiction question).
217. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 420 F.3d at 705.
218. This question will be addressed in Part III.B.
219. Sinochem, 436 F.3d at 363. On this point, the Third Circuit noted its disagreement
with the D.C. Circuit in Papandreou, which stressed the non-merits aspect of the forum non
conveniens dismissal despite the seeming incongruity of an abstention from indeterminate
jurisdiction. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. Note, also, that the Third Circuit
appears to depart from the Supreme Court's holding in Steel Co. that a district court may
abstain from the exercise of unconfirmed pendent jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env't, 523 U.S. 84, 100 n.3 (1998) (distinguishing the holding in Moor v. County of
Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 715-16 (1973), from an impermissible exercise of hypothetical
jurisdiction).
220. Sinochem, 436 F.3d at 362-63.
221. The power of a federal court to sever a dispensable party to preserve diversity
jurisdiction is articulated in Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 826
(1989).
222. See Kamel v. Hill-Rom Co., 108 F.3d 799, 805-06 (7th Cir. 1997).
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destroyed complete diversity and, thus, compromised the court's subject-
matter jurisdiction, the appellate court determined that the district court
"lacked jurisdiction to rule on [the defendant's] forum non conveniens
motion." 223  Only by dismissing the expatriate party could the Seventh
Circuit restore complete diversity and affirm the dismissal under forum non
conveniens. 224 Next, the Third Circuit cited the Ninth Circuit's reversal of
a dismissal under forum non conveniens because of a want of federal
jurisdiction. 225  There, a number of class action cases that had been
removed to federal court were dismissed by the district court under forum
non conveniens. 226 The Ninth Circuit, however, determined that the district
court's subject-matter jurisdiction was defective and, on that basis, vacated
the forum non conveniens and ordered a remand to state court.227 While
these cases demonstrate that an obvious defect in subject-matter jurisdiction
eliminates all jurisdictional guesswork and, on that basis, pretermits a
forum non conveniens dismissal, neither speaks to the circumstance extant
in Sinochem where jurisdiction poses a question that the district court
obviously deems more complex than the forum non conveniens question
and the appellate court cannot resolve the jurisdiction question on its
own.
228
The Third Circuit confessed to having some reservations in ruling that
district courts "must have jurisdiction before they can rule on which forum,
otherwise available, is more convenient to decide the merits." 229
Specifically, the court noted the potentially deleterious effect on judicial
economy. 230 However, in so ruling, the court sought to establish a bright-
line rule to avoid jurisdictional uncertainties based on "precedent, logic, and
the very terms of theforum non conveniens doctrine" itself.231
223. Id. at 805.
224. Id. at 806.
225. See Sinochem, 436 F.3d at 362-63 (citing Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 251
F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2001)).
226. Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 798.
227. Id. at 808-09. The federalism comity principles underlying the court's decision in
Patrickson are similar to the arguments raised by the respondent in Ruhrgas. See supra note
78; see also Sinochem, 436 F.3d at 369 n.26 (Stapleton, J., dissenting) (discussing comity
concerns in Patrickson). There, however, the Supreme Court determined that an immediate
remand to state court for want of subject-matter jurisdiction was not required because "the
district court may find that concerns of judicial economy and restraint are overriding."
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 586 (1999). "The federal design allows
leeway for sensitive judgments of this sort." Id. at 587. The cases may be distinguishable
because, whereas in Patrickson the appellate court conclusively established a lack of federal
jurisdiction, Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 798, the district court in Ruhrgas never established, nor
undertook to establish, the existence vel non of subject-matter jurisdiction, see Ruhrgas, 526
U.S. at 580.
228. See supra note 216.
229. Sinochem, 436 F.3d at 363-64 ("[W]e would like to leave district courts with another
arrow in their dismissal quivers.").
230. Id. at 364 (noting that the holding could "result in a waste of resources if the case is
again dismissed before the substance of [petitioner's] claim is decided").
231. Id. This court chose to go a "more certain way" than the D.C. Circuit, which
authorized a forum non conveniens dismissal in the absence of jurisdiction but not those
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c. The Sinochem Dissent
The Third Circuit holding was not unanimous. In a dissenting opinion,
Judge Walter K. Stapleton emphasized the pragmatic benefits conferred by
the forum non conveniens dismissal. The dissent argued that the majority's
holding subverted the purpose of the forum non conveniens doctrine by
requiring jurisdictional discovery. 232 The dissent was concerned primarily
that a defendant, haled into court in an inappropriate forum, would have to
"shoulder the burden of substantial and unnecessary effort and expense" in
complying with a jurisdictional discovery order that the dissent considered
unnecessary. 233 Moreover, the majority's support for the principle that a
potentially incompetent forum is foreclosed from forum non conveniens
analysis was not sufficiently persuasive for the dissent to dictate a formal
sequencing of issues in light of the substantial detriment to judicial
economy that it would engender. 234 The dissent also pointed to the lack of
precedent for the principle that a court must first satisfy itself of jurisdiction
before turning to forum non conveniens, distinguishing the circuit court
opinions on which the majority relied. 235 While it conceded that it is
important for the court to determine that the alternative forum is
jurisdictionally competent, "there is no utility in, and no doctrinal necessity
for, insisting that the present forum determine its own jurisdiction before
dismissing."236 Rather, the flexibility accorded the federal courts by the
Supreme Court's holdings in Steel Co. and Ruhrgas should not be curtailed
by requiring a district court to "affirmatively determin[e] the boundaries of
its jurisdiction" at all costs in order to dismiss under forum non
conveniens. 237
III. AUTHORIZING THE RUHRGASDISMISSAL ON THE GROUND OF FORUM
NON CONVENIENS
The Supreme Court's holdings in Steel Co. and Ruhrgas demonstrate the
intersection of two competing concerns.238 First, the Court is sensitive to
the notion that our federal system requires courts of limited jurisdiction. 239
The policy that subject-matter jurisdiction be established prior to the
issuance of a ruling on the merits ensures that these courts do not overstep
the bounds established by both the Constitution and Congress. 240 Second,
orders where dismissal is subject to conditions. Id. at 363-64; see supra note 166 and
accompanying text.
232. Sinochem, 436 F.3d at 368 (Stapleton, J., dissenting).
233. Id.
234. See id. at 368-70.
235. See id. at 368 & n.25, 369 & n.26; see supra notes 220-27 and accompanying text.
236. Sinochem, 436 F.3d at 370 (Stapleton, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 369-70.
238. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999); Steel Co. v. Citizens for
a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
239. See Idleman, supra note 9, at 42.
240. See supra Part I.A.
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the Supreme Court recognizes that, in order to operate efficiently, the
federal courts need the flexibility to dispose of cases on an array of
threshold grounds.241  The overly formalist limiting of this flexibility
through the imposition of a rigid order of operations impedes the
administration of justice and adds to the already substantial cost of
litigation. 242 By permitting the courts to dismiss a case for want of personal
jurisdiction without first establishing a difficult-to-determine issue of
subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court reconciled these two considerations:
The Court ceded some measure of flexibility to federal courts to
expediently dismiss a case without deciding the underlying substantive
claim.243
This part argues that courts, subject to the same restrictions outlined in
Ruhrgas, should have the flexibility to defer difficult subject-matter
jurisdiction determinations and dismiss under forum non conveniens. The
courts' invocation of the doctrine forestalls a decision on the merits and,
accordingly, forum non conveniens is appropriate for a Ruhrgas dismissal.
While subject-matter jurisdiction may appear a mandatory prerequisite to a
court's dismissal on such grounds, this stipulation runs contrary to the
flexible benefits derived from forum non conveniens. It is both feasible and
worthwhile to outline a set of considerations by which the federal courts
may determine the propriety of issuing a forum non conveniens dismissal
without antecedent confirmation of subject-matter jurisdiction.
A. Finding a Middle Road Through the Circuit Split: Forum Non
Conveniens as a Non-merits Ground Fit for Ruhrgas Dismissal
This section will address the two fundamental issues on which the
various circuit courts have disagreed with regard to the preemptive forum
non conveniens dismissal. This section argues that (1) forum non
conveniens is a non-merits issue in accordance with the analysis of the
Second, Third, and District of Columbia Circuits; and (2) the assumption of
jurisdiction, where a litigant's challenge to that jurisdiction requires
difficult or complex analysis, does not impair the competence of the district
court to properly invoke Gilbert and its progeny to render a dismissal under
forum non conveniens.
1. Forum Non Conveniens Is a Non-merits Issue
In 2005, the Fifth Circuit determined that a court may not dismiss a case
on the ground of forum non conveniens without first establishing
jurisdiction over the dispute because forum non conveniens is a merits-
based issue.244 Its argument is predicated, in large part, on a determination
by the Supreme Court that the denial of a forum non conveniens motion
241. See supra Part 1.B.2.
242. See supra note 70; see also Sinochem, 436 F.3d at 368 (Stapleton, J., dissenting).
243. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
244. See supra Part 11.1.2.
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does not fall within an enumerated exception to the collateral-order
doctrine. 245 The Court so held because proper analysis of the public and
private interest factors in the forum non conveniens test requires some
entanglement in the merits of the underlying dispute.246 The Fifth Circuit's
reliance on the Supreme Court in this instance is misplaced.247
The collateral-order doctrine is designed to protect the independence of
the district court judge and to prevent time-consuming and duplicative
analysis of district court decisions that do not render a suit final. 248 Clearly,
the denial of a motion to dismiss under forum non conveniens does not end
the underlying dispute. As such, the Supreme Court deemed forum non
conveniens analysis "on the merits" only in the sense that the district court
has evaluated many of substantive facts that gave rise to the dispute in
formulating the basis for the denial of the motion. Later, relying on the
same set of underlying facts, the district court may issue an order that ends
the dispute on an unrelated ground. Thus, in the normal course of things, it
is a waste of judicial resources to allow interlocutory review on a non-
determinative ruling.
The concern in Steel Co., however, is that a court may make a ruling that
settles the substantive claim underlying the dispute without proper subject-
matter jurisdiction.249 Thus, there is a fundamental difference between a
dismissal under forum non conveniens, which ends the dispute for the
purposes of the home forum, and a denial of such a motion, which allows
the case to proceed in the district court. For the purposes of a dismissal, a
simple view of the merits in the course of evaluating the various public and
private interest factors is not comparable to the resolution of the substantive
claim.250 If the most basic examination of the facts in the evaluation of a
threshold issue rendered that issue one "on the merits," then no inquiry
could be considered non-merits, a result patently inconsistent with
Ruhrgas.25'
Personal jurisdiction provides an excellent comparison. For instance, for
a court to establish specific jurisdiction 252 over a defendant, it must
245. See supra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
246. See supra text accompanying note 182.
247. Cf Sinochem, 436 F.3d at 359 (holding that Van Cuwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S.
517 (1988), is "not dispositive" for the principle that forum non conveniens is a non-merits
inquiry pursuant to Steel Co. and Ruhrgas).
248. Biard, 486 U.S. at 527 ("The requirement that the order be completely separate from
the merits is a distillation of the principle that there should not be piecemeal review of steps
towards final judgment in which they will merge." (internal quotation omitted)).
249. As Justice Scalia held in Steel Co., the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction renders
the resulting decision on the merits impermissibly advisory and in violation of the doctrine
of separation of powers. See supra notes 3 1-35 and accompanying text.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 132-34.
251. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999) ("It is hardly novel
for a federal court to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the
merits.").
252. Specific jurisdiction over a defendant may be asserted when the defendant's contacts
with the forum, though sporadic or isolated, give rise to the plaintiff's claim. See Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) ("Where a forum seeks to assert specific
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consider whether plaintiffs claims arise from the defendant's contacts
within the forum. 253  The plaintiff must demonstrate that "but for"
defendant's forum-related contacts, the injury would not have occurred. 254
To this extent, the court must examine the defendant's contacts, the relation
of those contacts to the plaintiffs injury, and, in so doing, take into account
the specific facts that constitute the merits of the action. Similarly, in
weighing whether trial in the home forum is fair pursuant to the private
interest prong of the forum non conveniens test, the court must undertake an
analysis of the "merits." 255  Thus, mere consideration of the factual
underpinnings of a case cannot be enough to establish an issue as "on the
merits." If it were otherwise, the Ruhrgas decision, which authorizes the
preemptive dismissal for want of personal jurisdiction, would clearly
violate the jurisdiction-before-merits mandate of Steel Co.
For the purposes of addressing issues in light of Steel Co., the better view
is that taken by the Second, Third, and D.C. Circuits that forum non
conveniens is a non-merits issue.256 This approach is buttressed by the
holdings of the Supreme Court in any context other than the collateral-order
doctrine. 257 One conventional understanding of the term "on the merits,"
that any decision so styled carries preclusive effect that bars relitigation of
the substantive claim, does not apply to forum non conveniens. 258 A
dismissal under forum non conveniens is preclusive only to relitigation of
the forum non conveniens issue in the federal courts of the same state, and,
to this extent, carries less preclusive effect to the state courts than even
personal jurisdiction.259 In fact, the entire purpose of the doctrine is to
divine the existence of an adequate alternative forum wherein the merits are
more appropriately resolved. Moreover, the deliberate abstention from the
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who has not consented to suit there, this fair
warning requirement is satisfied if the defendant has purposefully directed his activities at
residents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate
to those activities." (citations and internal quotation omitted)); Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984). General jurisdiction, by contrast,
exists when a defendant's contacts with the forum are so continuous, substantial, and
systematic as to justify haling the defendant into court to defend a cause of action unrelated
to those contacts. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.9.
253. See, e.g., Harlow v. Children's Hosp., 432 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2005); Glencore
Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Hamarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2002);
Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of First Church of Christ, Sci. v. Nolan, 259 F.3d 209, 216 (4th
Cir. 2001).
254. See Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001).
255. See supra text accompanying note 133.
256. See supra Part II.B. 1, II.B.3.a.
257. See supra notes 195-206 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
259. See Vasquez v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 325 F.3d 665, 678 (5th Cir. 2003); Baris
v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 74 F.3d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 1996). One commentator has suggested
that the issue preclusive effect of Ruhrgas dismissals should be confined to federal court in
order to avoid infringing upon state adjudicatory interests that are typically protected by the
limited jurisdiction of the federal courts. See Edney, supra note 76, at 195. Note, however,
that this special protection is unnecessary for a Ruhrgas dismissal under forum non
conveniens given the doctrine's lack of issue preclusive effect in state court.
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exercise of jurisdiction is as non-merits as the discretionary declination of
pendant jurisdiction, specifically addressed in Steel Co. as an "exception" to
the Court's repudiation of hypothetical jurisdiction.260 Thus, forum non
conveniens is a non-merits issue sufficient for a Ruhrgas dismissal.
2. Forum Non Conveniens Does Not Require Antecedent Confirmation of
Jurisdiction
Courts rely primarily on case law for the principle that, in order to
dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens, both the foreign and home
forum must have subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over
the dispute.261 However, it never explains why this must apply to the home
forum other than by reference to non-dispositive precedent. 262 Perhaps the
rationale for the prerequisite stems from the nature of the evaluative
analysis under forum non conveniens. 263 When balancing the public
interest factors enunciated in Gilbert,264 the reviewing court's lack of
definitive jurisdiction over either the dispute or the parties may be a thumb
on the scale in favor of dismissal. According to Gilbert, the test weighs the
appropriateness of two jurisdictionally competent forums, though the
Supreme Court made clear that dismissal is appropriate only in those
"exceptional circumstances" when this "balance is strongly in favor of the
defendant. '265 In this scenario, the Third Circuit may be concerned that, if
the home forum is not definitively competent, it would impermissibly skew
the analysis in favor of the competent foreign forum, thereby making
dismissal far less "exceptional."
This concern is not enough, however, to warrant the establishment of a
rigid order of operations for forum non conveniens. First, the number of
cases in which jurisdictional incompetence is a looming factor should be
limited.266 In order to engage in the analysis of whether forum non
conveniens is an appropriate ground for preemptive dismissal in the first
place, it should at least be feasible that the home court is jurisdictionally
competent. 267 If the defect in jurisdiction is blatant, the court should
260. This reasoning was employed in Papandreou by the D.C. Circuit. See supra notes
164-65 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
262. The dissent in Sinochem argues that the case law on which the majority relies does
not require the result that it reaches. See Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp. v. Sinochem Int'l Co.,
436 F.3d 349, 368-69 (Stapleton, J., dissenting).
263. See supra notes 120-34 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
265. Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504, 508 (1947); see supra notes 127-30 and
accompanying text.
266. See infra Part IlI.B.
267. The Ninth Circuit, in a case relied upon by the Sinochem majority, vacated an order
dismissing an action under forum non conveniens because it made a conclusive
determination that the federal court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. See Patrickson v. Dole
Food Co., Inc., 251 F.3d 795, 808 (9th Cir. 2001); supra note 227. In Monde Re, however,
the question of whether the court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute was never
resolved. Cf Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M. (Monde Re) v. Nak Naftogaz, 311 F.3d
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dismiss on that ground from the outset.268 Second, where resolving a very
close call on jurisdiction might entail considerable and/or burdensome
discovery or delay, the court should be able to operate under the assumption
that jurisdiction is correct. It is, of course, centrally important according to
Gilbert that the alternative foreign forum is competent. 269 If, however, the
competence of the home forum is plausible, but still not definite, it is well
within the capacity of the district court to assign this "defect" no weight in
the overall forum non conveniens jurisdiction calculus. The test itself is
incredibly pliant, designed for case-by-case analysis, 270 and this variable
does not come close to fundamentally altering the Gilbert and Piper tests.
While it is not clear why the Third Circuit places such great emphasis on
a presupposed, though never fully articulated, doctrinal requirement that
subject-matter jurisdiction is a mandatory prerequisite, it is obvious that a
preemptive dismissal under forum non conveniens may save precious
judicial resources and lower litigation costs. As the dissent points out in
Sinochem, the doctrine is designed, in part, to avoid "unnecessary effort and
expense." 271 It makes little sense to apply the doctrine in a manner that will
impose a "substantial and unnecessary litigation burden" on both the
defendant and the court. 272 This is especially so when the subject-matter
jurisdiction question imposes considerable delays, such as expensive and
lengthy jurisdictional discovery, and the likely result is for the court to
dismiss on the original forum non conveniens grounds anyway once
jurisdiction is established. When appropriate, a district court should have
the ability to bypass an unnecessary technicality to reach a decision it
would have reached anyway.
B. Devising a Test for Evaluation of the Propriety of a Preemptive Forum
Non Conveniens Dismissal
Towards the end of its opinion in Sinochem, the Third Circuit explicitly
leaves the final determination of the propriety of the preemptive forum non
488, 497 (2d Cir. 2002) ("The district court in the case at bar failed to address the
jurisdictional issue raised by Ukraine's motion, proceeding instead to the forum non
convenience issue raised in that same motion."). Thus, it was possible that jurisdiction
actually existed in that case.
268. See 15 Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 211, § 3828 ("If the case is wanting in
[subject-matter or personal jurisdiction], the action should be dismissed on that ground
without reaching questions offorum non conveniens."); cf Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,
526 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1999) ("[W]e recognize that in most instances subject-matter
jurisdiction will involve no arduous inquiry. In such cases, both expedition and sensitivity to
state courts' coequal stature should impel the federal court to dispose of that issue first."
(citation and internal quotation omitted)).
269. See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 507.
270. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1981) ("If central emphasis
were placed on any one factor, the forum non conveniens doctrine would lose much of the
very flexibility that makes it so valuable."); see supra text accompanying note 128.
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conveniens dismissal to the Supreme Court.273 This section takes up the
challenge.
The first step in assessing whether the court should bypass an affirmative
determination of subject-matter jurisdiction in favor of a dismissal under
forum non conveniens is to examine the extent to which subject-matter
jurisdiction is still possible. While Steel Co. stands narrowly for the
proposition that a federal court may not take up the merits before
establishing jurisdiction, it also represents the broader principle that
subject-matter jurisdiction is an essential element of the structure of the
federal judiciary. To permit a court to dismiss under forum non conveniens
when subject-matter jurisdiction is clearly wanting would subvert the very
important structural function played by subject-matter jurisdiction. This
implicates a number of the cases relied upon by the Third Circuit. In the
first, the appellate court made a determination that the presence of a non-
diverse party destroyed diversity. 274 Similarly, in the second, the appellate
court determined that the district court lacked statutory subject-matter
jurisdiction over the suit and vacated the forum non conveniens
dismissal. 275 In each case, the court made the correct decision to reverse
the dismissal under forum non conveniens because there was a conclusive
determination that subject-matter jurisdiction was absent.
The requirement that the subject-matter jurisdiction question remain alive
is especially true with regard to cases removed to the federal court. In such
cases, the challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction implicates the dignity of
the state courts. When subject-matter jurisdiction is found wanting, the
case should properly be remanded to and litigated in state court. In
Ruhrgas, however, the Supreme Court deemed the lower federal courts up
to the task of dealing sensitively in such instances. The Court instructed
district courts to forcefully apply the statutory rules on removal in order to
weed out cases clearly lacking federal jurisdiction. It is only where the
"alleged defect in subject-matter jurisdiction raises a difficult and novel
question" that the court may turn directly to non-merits issues such as
personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. 276 The essential feature of
these difficult and novel questions, at least at this stage of the analysis, is
that they are still being asked and, as such, subject-matter jurisdiction
appears feasible.
273. See id. at 364. The Supreme Court will consider a petition for certiorari that presents
the question of
[w]hether [the Supreme] Court should resolve the conflict between the Second,
Third and Fifth Circuits regarding the question of whether it is permissible ... for
a federal court to rule on a motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens
without first determining whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear
the action?
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, Tyumen Oil Co. v. Norex Petroleum Ltd., 2006 WL
431070 (U.S. Feb. 17, 2006) (No. 05-1070).
274. Kamel v. Hill-Rom Co., 108 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 1997); see supra notes 220-23 and
accompanying text.
275. Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2001).
276. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 588 (1999).
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The courts' sensitivity to the dignity interest of the state courts in
removal cases may justify the result reached in Dominguez-Cota. Unlike
Monde Re, where litigation originated in federal court, the plaintiffs in
Dominguez-Cota chose to litigate the action in state court. When the
defendants removed the case to federal court on a fraudulent joinder theory,
the district court might have concluded that "sensitivity to state courts'
coequal statute should impel" 277 it to dispose of the subject-matter
jurisdiction issue first. As such, it may have been the type of removal case
in which federalism concerns trumped the efficiency gained by application
of forum non conveniens. The Fifth Circuit, however, never articulated this
reasoning in vacating the district court's forum non conveniens dismissal.
The comparative analysis of the relative difficulty of the non-merits and
subject-matter jurisdiction issues is another concern. The Supreme Court
may take up the task of devising a test to measure the relative difficulty of
the subject-matter jurisdiction issue against the rather straightforward forum
non conveniens analysis.278 However, the Court has demonstrated in
Ruhrgas that it is comfortable leaving the relative difficulty decision to the
discretion of district courts.279 The Court has recognized that, "in most
instances subject-matter jurisdiction will involve no arduous inquiry," 280
and indicates that it expects the courts to turn to these issues from the
outset.281 In this sense, the comparison of forum non conveniens to subject-
matter jurisdiction would simply be another "sensitive judgment[]" that our
federalist court system permits.282
CONCLUSION
Forum non conveniens is a doctrine of considerable flexibility vested in
the discretion of federal courts. A dismissal on such grounds in the absence
of subject-matter jurisdiction is not an impermissible merits decision. It is
simply the recognition that, on balance, the case is more appropriately
adjudicated in another forum. The Supreme Court has indicated that the
federal courts are competent to make exactly this type of threshold
procedural decision without formal resolution of a challenge to their
subject-matter jurisdiction. Moreover, a strict structuring of non-merits
issues would serve to frustrate the very flexibility that makes forum non
conveniens such a valuable tool for judicial consideration of internationally
tinged disputes. Thus, a Ruhrgas dismissal under forum non conveniens is
277. Id. at 587-88.
278. See Idleman, supra note 9, at 14-17 (discussing comparative analysis of issues). One
commentator has suggested that, in an ironic twist, the now-defunct doctrine of hypothetical
jurisdiction may provide a useful means of analysis. See id. at 15.
279. See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 588 ("Where ... a district court has before it a
straightforward personal jurisdiction issue presenting no complex question of state law, and
the alleged defect in subject-matter jurisdiction raises a difficult and novel question, the
court does not abuse its discretion by turning directly to personal jurisdiction.").
280. Id. at 587.
281. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
282. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 587.
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proper, under certain circumstances, without antecedent resolution of a
difficult subject-matter jurisdiction question.
Notes & Observations
